Lion Research Co strives for collaborative peace & a diplomatic resolution. We fully support Guyana’s sovereign integrity & independence. Bad peace does however exist.
The West is strong, very strong indeed. In terms of economic, political & military might. However, the west at times is pathetic to put it plainly. ‘Politics stops at the water’s edge’ should be followed however in recent years it is not. Threats from authoritarian regimes have always existed however in recent times these countries are willingly to take action. The major enemies of the free world China, Russia, North Korea, & the Iranian regime are not pathetic. They act ruthlessly without hesitation. They gamble on consequences & due to the west’s self imposed weakness during critical times the risk threshold is low. It is too late for millions of people around the world. This aforementioned bloc of countries via their actions & manipulation of the social media sphere have done well to create a mirage. There is a fallacy about their strength. The idea that they are unstoppable is a very clever illusion. Action should have been taken yesterday however something can still be done today. Many may love President Obama but if you’re Syrian or Ukrainian you will not. Obama made an election promise to wind down US involvement in wars especially in the Middle East. Restorative is the best adjective to sum up his administration. On top of wars he had to manage a bad economic crisis. However, the lack of support for Ukraine & Syrian rebels have long lasting dire consequences. Ukraine was invaded fully on February 24th 2022 due to the concession of Donbas & Crimea. Ukraine was begging for any weapons however the US refused. This emboldened Putin to act more aggressively. For Syrian rebels the lack of MANPADS & other weaponry was critical. Mi-8s are used massively by Al Assad in their attacks. This falter in support allowed for Russia to intervene when Al Assad was on the back foot. The intervention in 2015 was a life saver for the Syrian regime. Al Assad was able to advance & push back. Now Al Assad & Putin have a comfortable position in Syria. The failure to properly arm Ukraine means Iran, China & the DPRK will support Russia more & more. The west promised to take action against those that help Russia. However, DPRK has supplied artillery, rockets & ballistic missiles to Russia with little consequences. Iranian backed militias in the Middle East have fired rocket volley after rocket volley at US troops. This resulted in injuries especially brain injuries from blast waves. Only after 3 service personnel were killed did the US take action. However, Iranian territory was not touched. Many countries help Russia bypass sanctions with not much political or economic backlash. The west is not quick to act. A lack of unity is one issue. Another more pressing issue is the the desire from certain politicians to favour short term profit objectives over long term strategic investments.
On precedent Guyana being a commonwealth country means the UK should take lead in helping. However, due to the proximity to the US then it makes sense the US has taken the lead already. When the US did Op. Urgent Fury in Grenada, Thacker was in private annoyed for the lack of early warning & the fact this is the US intervening in a Commonwealth country. Saying this the Royal Navy sent River class patrol boat HMS Trent on an exercise off the Guyanese coast with Guyana.
Brief history:
The Crisis of 1895 & the 1899 Paris Arbitral Award are the most famous events in this long standing issue. The award gave the Essequibo region to Guyana. Britain gained control of the Essequibo & other regions with the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1814. The border based on the Paris award was finalised by the 1905 British-Venezuelan Mixed Boundary Commision. The dispute arises due to the colonial background of Guyana (British) & Venezuela (Spanish). The Geneva Agreement in 1966 between Guyana, Venezuela, and the UK was poor. It was nothing substantial. It was meant to be temporary only. The agreement is a pledge to find a permanent & ‘practical’ solution. Soon after the Geneva Agreement Venezuela broke this by occupying Ankoko island. This was turned into a military base. In recent months the presence here has increased. Venezuela deems the Paris Arbitral Award null & void. A remnant of colonialism. They formally protested to the UN in 1962. The US was a strong advocate of having this diplomatic deal.
Guyana wants the issue settled by the ICJ (International Criminal Court). The ICJ has agreed to hear the case. It has requested Venezuela to refrain from action.
Ukraine aid workaround:
Guyana does not have the capital currently to invest in the modernisation of their armed forces however there is a solution. US aid to Ukraine is vital in all areas of defence especially when it comes to ammunition supply. Supporting Ukraine is one of the most cost effective foreign policies of the century. However, Republicans are delaying crucial Ukrainian aid to benefit their own agendas even though the majority of this aid stays in the US supporting jobs & the supply chain. This is putting both Ukraine & the USA at great risk. Ammunition constraint is having major issues for Ukrainian forces to defend from brutal assault waves. This requires careful thinking. The US for a while has been buying Soviet/old ammunition & stored equipment from third countries. However the necessity of these deals have increased since Joe Biden cannot do any more packages currently until more funding is approved. Recently the US has started to perform their own version of the German Ringtausch program. Ringtausch means exchange. Germany gives European countries (so far Czechia, Greece, Slovakia, Slovenia) Germany military equipment in exchange for them sending Soviet weapons to Ukraine. The US program has some twists. $200m of American arms to Ecuador for mainly Osa air defence systems (SA-8). Now Greece has been approved to purchase F-35s. Then Greece announced they will be transferring ‘obsolete’ Soviet equipment to Ukraine. These two announcements are not by chance. Guyana does have some Soviet systems which the US would be happy to exchange. The Soviet mortar, rocket & small arms ammunition would be of most use. It is a win-win for all countries. Ukraine gets ammo. Guyana can be resupplied with more effective American weaponry. Additionally, US advisors can more easily logistically help Guyana with storage & maintenance. Guyana having more western weaponry ties the two into a stronger alliance. However, Guyana does not have a good track record for storing equipment. The weapons would need to be properly checked, serviced & refurbed. Guyana does not have the capabilities to do this themselves however US & Ukraine can. In recent years there have been a number of base explosions killing & injuring service personnel. During the first 6 six months of 2020 there were two separate major incidents involving the handling of pyrotechnics & other explosives.
Only after the second incident was a Board of Enquiry formed. This is a poor procedure. All military deaths must be properly investigated.
Whilst writing this report, sources with AP reported that Guyana has been promised support from the US in a number of military areas. Ranging from radars & drones to helicopters & planes. The exact package value or model is not known. On paper it seems reasonable however the actual practical aspect of this will be discussed later.
Battle Plan:
To start with, Brazil will not be invaded. Logistically it would make sense due to the presence of vastly improved road infrastructure & terrain. The terrain of the Raposa serra de sol (region of Brazil which borders Venezuela & Guyana) is tropical savannah. Relatively flat, dry & open dotted with hills. This is suitable for the movement of heavy mechanised units. Disadvantages are the lack of cover & once you reach the Guyana-Brazil border you have to deal with the Rio Mau. The number of bridgeheads is very limited. So portable ferries & armoured vehicle launched bridges would be needed. The river is not overly wide so it would not be technically difficult. However, putting up bridges under combat conditions is a very challenging process. You are very vulnerable to attack. Well trained crews who are smooth & efficient can reduce this. The Russian Army near Bilohorivka lost a very large number of troops & equipment (a large chunk of a battalion) on May 8th 2022. The slow bottleneck nature of bridge crossing makes it difficult. However, Guyana lacks an attack capability with the air force, has limited heavy artillery & drone units so the threat is low. The heavy losses on the Russian side can be attributed as well due to the clustering of units. The clumping of units is an issue for both Ukraine & Russia. Proper spacing saves lives. It would make it possible to invade Guyana via an unexpected axis. Similar to Germany invading Belgium to bypass the well defended Maginot Line. This manoeuvre resulted in a successful flank of Allied forces.
However, Maduro is not stupid. Venezuela would not win a war against Brazil & Guyana. Venezuela wants as little foreign involvement supporting Guyana as possible. Brazil is reinforcing its northern border region with extra mechanised battalions as a precaution. It is questionable how much support the US will provide Guyana. However if Brazil was invaded alongside Guyana it would be a lot more likely the US Armed Forces would become directly involved. Venezuela sees this crisis as a bilateral issue over land they see as theirs so why would they invade another country in the process. If Venezuela invaded via Brazil once they entered Guyana they would still encounter the difficult terrain of the Essequibo region.
Lion Research Co analysis points towards an unorthodox prediction for any potential conflict. Most analysts point towards a multi-pronged jungle offensive. This would suit the Guyana Defence Forces (GDF). Jungle warfare does not allow for force multipliers to be used effectively. This was evident during the Vietnam war. The US was not able to bring its full technological military strength to bear. Thick jungle & mountainous terrain means it is difficult to manoeuvre heavy armoured forces. The natural camouflage means tunnels & ambushes are easier to construct. Spotting targets is hard but the jungle means it is even harder. When US forces were in contact with the enemy in Vietnam most of the time they could not be seen. Utilising geographic features solid fortifications can be created. The best fortifications use a composite of man made & nature features. A key example of this was the Finnish Mannerheim line. When the Soviets invaded during the Winter war of 1939 the line was not finished by any means. Compared to the Maginot line in terms of the mass of concrete & the number of hardened structures it was not even 5%. However, the line held the Soviet back. Jungle warfare allows for a flexible defence. The GDF cannot by any metric hold back an invasion. Their idea will be to make Venezuela bleed & delay them in the jungles. Companies will be stretched very thin. Only key positions will be able to be properly defended. Funnelling forces into areas where Guyana has any advantage is a must. However mechanised forces can be held back by anti-tank trenches, barbed wire, anti-tank mines (these are legal however some countries have banned anti-personnel mines). No tank can freely ride over properly placed barbed wire. Fortified fighting positions alongside the trenches will be host to the few heavy weaponry. Since the GDF will be locals they can use their own knowledge to maintain defilade positions. Even if this goes exactly to plan Venezuela will be able to overcome Guyana by sheer force.
Lion Research Co prediction:
Phase 1 (H hour):
Shock & awe will most likely be the opening act. The idea is to cause panic & disarray. Panic is a very powerful force which can spiral out of control causing a drop in morale & increase the likelihood of desertion. Key military targets such as barracks, storage depots, C2 nodes, & logistical infrastructure will be targeted.
Venezuela has a vast advantage in terms of ammunition, precision aerial munitions, tube/rocket artillery, mortars & drones. Due to Guyana’s small size, long range systems such as the 2S19 & BM-30 will be able to reach far.
Maduro does not have an issue as such with Guyana as a whole but wants the oil & mine rich region of Esequiba. It is unlikely that decapitation strikes will be ordered against the Guyanese government. Keeping them alive will work in Venezuela’s favour. In contrast, Saddam Hussain was targeted (albeit unsuccessfully) in the shock & awe element of Op. Iraqi Freedom. Saddam Hussain & his government were the main target however in the initial operations.
Special Forces & jungle warfare units to cross into the jungle at night. Infiltrators to become active. Guyana will respond by ordering general mobilisation & the redeployment of forces to the border.
This initial shock & troop redeployment is what Venezuela wants. It will make key targets more vulnerable. Maduro does have a strong connection with Wagner. The current structure & operations of Wagner is hard to tell since Prigozhin & Utkin were assassinated after the botched coup/rebellion. Heavy equipment has been turned over to the Russian Armed Forces & National Guard. Regarding the troops many have signed MoD contracts. Wagner group in Venezuela in the past has provided close security detail for Madura & performed training of elite units. It is plausible that Wagner or other hired mercenaries will take part in any offensive. They will be given specialist objectives to achieve.
Likely time for H hour is 05:00
Phase 2 (H hour +3):
Helicopter, & amphibious assault forces to land at key military targets & take control of the capital alongside other major settlements. Georgetown, the capital, being on the coast makes this simpler. This will cut off Guyanese troops from resupply, command & they will be surrounded. Divide & conquer will then be used against the remaining pockets of resistance. If the plan does go like this then likely only the GDF special forces will be resisting. For resupply Venezuelan transport will land at captured air bases. This was the Russian resupply plan for Kyiv however the strong resistance at Antonov airport & the surrounding Homostel area by 4th rapid reaction brigade & other units put an end to this plan.
The time gap between phrases 1 & 2 is hard to tell, however, 3 hours seems reasonable. Shock would still be present however the risk of friendly fire would be less. One of the biggest risks to the Russian Air Force is Russian ground based air defence. Military coordination is important & takes a lot of work. Units are under different branches & chains of commands. A dynamic & digital defence infrastructure with real time feeds is needed. Venezuela is deficient in this whilst Guyana totally lacks it.
The jungle offensive bait manoeuvre is not too dissimilar from the 1991 Op. Desert Storm Hail Mary. General Schwarzkopf's plan was to lure the Iraqis into thinking an amphibious assault and an attack via Saudi Arabia into Kuwait on the main plan. This put the bulk of Saddam's troops into defensive positions inside Kuwait. Instead Coalition forces performed a left hook through the Iraqi desert & took the Iraqis by surprise.
Venezuela will be looking at a quick ‘peace deal’. Ideally within the day. Whatever deal signed will be forced upon Guyana however Venezuela will use it to attempt to dissuade foreign intervention.
The Biden administration so far has pledged support however there is no public discussion of direct intervention if Venezuela invades. The Lion Research Co prediction plan would work due current GDF equipment & man power however it is risky. If those helicopters & aircraft are shot down then a very high casualty rate is likely for the troops on board. The US Navy & Air Force would be able to very effectively down Venezuelan aircraft. So if the US pledges military intervention support then the multi-pronged jungle offensive plan would make more sense.
Opposition over migrants:
There are over 21k Venezuelans residing in Guyana. This figure only represents those registered with the government. The true figure is slightly higher. Opposition parties are urging action to be taken. The supermajority of these migrants are legitimate. However, it is likely a small number are foreign agents. Infiltrators can collect evidence, recruit other agents, & most critically perform sabotage. In 2014 the Czech Vrbetice ammunition depot explosion was the action of Russian GRU agents. Base security is vital. Strong perimeter fences, sentries & no camouflage avenues of entry. In the Pskov region of Russia, Ukrainian agents in late 2022 were able to blow up a Ka-52 at a repair base. Lack of guards, a base surrounded by woods with no fence made it not as difficult as it would seem. During the 2022 invasion of Ukraine sabotage groups played a key role in the attempted Kyiv offensive. To counter this Ukraine declared martial law, restricted movement, enacted a curfew & city wide combat patrols were increased especially at night. However, the issue with Guyana is that their police force & armed forces is small & they have no national guard. Being massively outnumbered by Venezuela means that their numbers on the frontline & on area security will be very thin. Guyana cannot afford to keep troops on base & area security. Moreover, Guyana base security needs to be massively improved. Russian base security, especially in the far east region, was mainly done by conscripts. It will not be popular however it may be necessary that Guyana introduces national service to help reduce this problem. Russian forces employ large numbers of remote sentry systems (G-BOSS); mainly of the Grenadier & Murom-M model. This cuts down the number of soldiers needed to patrol. Guyana should invest in these as they are totally lacking however foreign financial assistance would be needed.
Issues with the GDF:
Many issues plague the GDF. In the most simplest terms 3 key components make up combat effectiveness
Leadership
Training
Equipment
Guyana is lacking in all 3 & much more.
Corruption:
Guyana’s 2022 transparency international score was 40 (out of 100, higher number = less corrupt). Giving it a rank of 85/180. This is not terrible however far from great. Work needs to be done. The US State department & EU is working to improve the situation. In 2018 the anti-corruption Public Service Commision was reformed after being inactive for over a decade. Having swaths of natural resources often breed corruption. There can be exemptions most prominently Botswana. Alongside Russia, Botswana has one of the largest diamond reserves in the world. Botswana does not experience corruption like Guyana does. In 1966 Botswana gained independence & in 67 the Orapa diamond mine was discovered. President Sir Khama advocated for democracy, freedom, economic openness & strong anti-corruption measures. This was helped by the fact that during the period of British colonisation of the area Botswana was relatively overlooked; due to a presumed lack of resources & importance. The concept of openness & democracy is deep rooted in Botswana’s generally conservative society through the Kgotla. These communal public meetings can be used as forums to voice issues & settle disputes. The situation is however very different in Botswana. Colonialism was a lot more negatively impactful in Guyana than Botswana. There was a total shift in economy, population demographics & distribution. Racial tension does exist with strongly partisan politics. The People’s Progressive Party (PPP/C) is mainly supported by the Indo-Guyanese whilst the Afro-Guyanese support People’s National Congress (PNCR). Racial tensions were most prominent during the 60s. The most infamous event of them is the Wismar massacre against the Indo-Guyanese. In the decades since tensions have simmered but still remain. In 2020 the brutal killing of two Afro-Guyanese teenagers again ignited racial tensions. President Ali has tried to foster more peace. As long as racial tensions exist it will be harder to deal with chronic problems. Other former colonies such as Mauritius & Seychelles have racial issues. Venezuela & its major allies, especially Russia, will aim to increase this racial tension in Guyana to decrease unity in the face of aggression. This can be via media lobbying, propagandists, or operatives trying to incite tension.
Corruption already exists in the mining & forestry industries. Recent events have increased corruption in the primary sector. In 2015 Exxon discovered 11 billion barrels of oil. A considerable amount. This has the potential to transform Guyana into a developed country however provides a prime opportunity for corruption. Multiple cases of corruption have been identified in oil licences. There are still systemic issues with the strength of government institutions & the criminal justice system. Civil societies play a large role in how a country fights corruption. Strong civil institutions in Ukraine & Georgia have helped shape improvements in fighting corruption. In 2020 Guyana was ranked 134 in the ease of doing business. Slowness, complicated, bureaucratic processes & low civil servant salaries means companies are likely to pay bribes to expedite processes. Moreover, a sizable number of civil servants report they are not paid sufficiently.
Corruption is moderately rife in the GDF. GDF admits to ‘AK-47’ (more than likely Type-56/AKM) assault rifles going missing. These likely end up in the hands of local organised criminal gang or paramilitary groups in neighbouring countries. Armed robbery is an issue in Ghana especially around Georgetown & at night. Piracy attacks do still occur. It is to note however the majority of armed crime occur with knives, hunting/home made weaponry. If Venezuela invades then volunteers/conscripts will be called up to fight. When Russia invaded Ukraine fully, the Territorial Defence Force (TDF) numbers grew massively. These undertrained & underequipped performed well to stem the Russian offensive. Crucial in the defence of Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv among other places. If small arms & other equipment continue to go missing then these mobilised Guyanans will have much less to fight with. Oil & other supplies get sold to locals. Quite obviously this will reduce the combat effectiveness of any armed force. A very small minority of Ukrainian Armed Forces' small arms end up in the hands of criminals. These caches generally contain grenades, assault rifles & sometimes disposable rockets. These weapons stay in Ukraine. Ukrainian security agencies (National Police & SBU) do a good job at targeting this gun trade. Russian operatives play a key role in this illicit trade. It is likely that Venezuela will try to infiltrate/cooperate with local organised crime to increase weapon & other military resource trafficking.
President Ali has increased the pay of police & armed forces. A private is on slightly under 7k USD a year base salary. Police constable similar. Pay for police & armed forces is competitive in Guyana. Officer salary increases are suitable factoring in the extra work-load & responsibilities. This helps attract suitable & skilled recruits. Ukraine offers cash & security for any Russian pilot that wants to defect with their aircraft. Recently a Taiwanese CH-47 pilot was caught liaising with the PRC to defect. Venezuela may offer a similar program. The GDF apart from a couple of aircraft lack valuable assets to offer however. Counter operations can be effectively done in this field. An intelligence officer fakes interest in defecting. Venezuela will have to release some details to allow for this ‘defection’. Guyana & allies then act upon these details. Russia using this trick was able to successfully strike a Ukrainian air base. The biggest form of treachery Guyana needs to watch out for is the leaking of defensive plans. Despite a stiff fight from Ukrainian defenders upon full scale invasion the southern regions (Kherson & Zaporizhzhia) especially Kherson fell fast. This was due to a traitor leaking/selling defensive plans most critically of the minefields. This meant Russian forces were able to massively expedite their advance bypassing those troubled areas. Guyana lacks mine laying capabilities however they do have a defensive plan. Guyana needs all the help & luck it can get so classified material needs to be secure.
Guyana lacks troops so troop saving techniques need to be employed. Remote surveillance systems will be ideal in jungle conditions. Static surveillance systems such as Russian Grenadier and Murom-M systems are increasingly becoming more common in Ukraine. Remotely operated zoom and thermal camera which can autonomously track spot and targets. Live feeds are relayed to a command post. Ukraine has a similar system under an unknown name. To increase range signal relays can be used.
More complex systems such as the German SurveilSPIRE are used by Ukraine as well. It has a long range thermal and a system organic drone with AI. They can detect and process threats with an AI generated tag (truck, tank etc). It is used to protect the northern regions in Ukraine. The probability of a second invasion of Kyiv is slim. Ukraine has a lack of infantry. Large number of troops are being used to protect strategic targets & for anti-infiltrator tactics. This is compounding the issue. The lack of a full mobilisation is another major issue.
GDF oil & other supplies do get sold to locals in Guyana. Quite obviously this will reduce the combat effectiveness of any armed force. Selling oil resulted in a comical situation in northern Ukraine. Russian troops deployed to Belarus would sell oil to locals. Since the high command hid the true objective of their deployment (illegally invading Ukraine) they were not informed of the invasion date. Hence a number of vehicles ran out of fuel on their fateful journey to Kyiv.
Sanctions:
A number of countries have sanctions against Venezuela. Most importantly by the USA & the EU. These are for undemocratic actions, drug trafficking & human right violations. US sanctions started in 2005. The scope of the sanction include defence (arms sales & support), finance (debt, investment) & political (individual politician sanctions). Oil related sanctions were eased to counter the negative impact of sanctions/boycotts on Russian oil. Joe Biden’s administration has done a deal with Maduro to waive some sanctions (oil, gas, gold) on the condition of free election & release of certain prisoners (Americans/political prisoners). It is highly doubtful Maduro would actually allow for free as he would most certainly loose. Sanctions do not stop wars. The crisis when Russia was building up forces to fully invade Ukraine; Germany, US & many other countries were threatening sanctions. Russia invaded, sanctions hit & here we are. Germany threatened to cut the major project of the Nord Stream II which was. Sanctions do have a tangible impact on the Russian war effort. Instead of putting a spanner in the works, the sanctions only slow the gears down. Getting parts & equipment is made more expensive, more complicated & takes longer however it is still possible. Russian oil & other products can be sold via intermediates.
Equipment Overview
GDF equipment is interesting because it is a mix of Soviet, western cold war & Brazilian equipment. Guyana does not have its own defence industry. There is no major military production. The GDF infantry battalions are light infantry. There is a critical lack of vehicles. Military Balance 2023 only lists circa 6 Brazilian EE-9 Cascavels in service. These likely are not serviceable. Troops in recent years have not trained nor used them. The most common vehicles are unarmoured pickup trucks. These allow for high mobility & rapid mounting/dismounting however absolutely no protection under fire. These vehicles will not be able to travel close to the zero line. Last mile logistics will be difficult especially in the terrain. Ukraine has experimented with bikes, drones, UGV, & other unique ways to counter this issue. The small arms are mostly Soviet. This is fine. Soviet small arms are reliable & easy to use. The RPG-7 is the only anti-tank weaponry. It is again simple to use. The effectiveness of the weapon depends on the warhead used. There are countless types of warheads. The GDF only has the basic warheads. Against Venezuelan T-72Bs it is likely multiple hits will be necessary as Kontact-1 ERA can protect against these non-tandem shaped warheads. It is possible to get tandem RPG-7 warheads. They can be unreliable with a dud rate of circa 15%.
Air defence:
Air defence is one of the major issues the GDF will face. Without foreign intervention at medium/high altitudes Venezuela has complete air supremacy. At those altitudes the air space is uncontested. Guyana only possesses very limited low altitude V/SHORAD & no military grade radar. Weather radar is not at the correct frequency to detect military aircraft or any aircraft. Guyana ATC only operates secondary not primary radar. Primary radar is typical radar you have in mind. It scans for targets by recording radar reflections. Secondary radar only picks up aircraft with the correct transponder. This is used by mainly civilian airports. Since Venezuelan aircraft will not turn their frequencies to Guyana civilian ATC the radar will not be able to detect any hostile bogeys. There is a fix to this. Brazil, who supports Guyana strongly, will very likely provide radar, AEW&C & other intelligence/data reports. It is better that radar is located in Brazil rather than Guyana as Venezuela will not target Brazilian soil. Additionally, international allies, such as the US, can fly AWACS missions in international airspace & possibly Brazilian air space. President, Lula is not anti-American however he is a BRICS member & is critical of the US on certain points. However, due to the US being on the same side regarding Guyana, Lula will likely co-operative with Biden. AEW&C systems are powerful aircraft which have radar & other surveillance systems to detect, track & help target a number of enemy assets. They are crucial in ISTAR. Western allies fly a number of AEW&C missions over the Black Sea & Eastern Europe for Ukraine in their fight against Russian imperialism. Their overall impact is hard to gauge as the target information is classified. But as Russia harasses, performs dangerous intercept manoeuvres, & generally complains about the flights. It can be assumed they have a tangible impact. Regarding the US, in case of increased tension or war at least one carrier strike group will be sent to the 4th fleet area of operations under SOUTHCOM. Carrier borne E-2 Hawkeyes can operate. If Brazilian air bases cannot be used. Then bases in Florida will be used to fly E-3 & RC-135 missions. These will require aerial refuelling from KC-135 to extend loitering time. Not a AEW&C as such however RQ-4 Global Hawk drones will fly recon missions. Unlike the other aircraft mentioned, the RQ-4 performs imagery intelligence. These aircraft can provide potent targeting information providing the much necessary early warning to muster their small army in the necessary places. Due to the might of the US Air Force & Navy these flights can be continuous. Since they take place in international airspace they carry little risk & political concern. It is not an act of war. Due to strength of the 4th fleet Venezuelan air & naval forces will keep within Guyanese territorial waters (12 nautical miles)
The Guyana V/SHORAD comprises a number of ZPU-4 (quad KPV 14.5mm Soviet HMG). These are manually loaded & guided by a crew without radar gun cueing. Only effective against slow moving low flying drones or helicopters within 3km. Even if they are inaccurate they will be able to provide a limited harassing deterrence. It is a mechanically reliable system. In the GDF it is mounted as a stationary weapon on wheels. However, attaching it to a pickup to create a technical makes sense. As this would allow for rapid survivability relocation. Ukrainian mobile fire teams operate the Czech made MR-2 Viktor. Which is a Toyota land cruiser with a ZPU-2 (same but double not quad) & night vision/thermal sight.
Other media reports say Guyana has Strela-2 MANPADS (man portable air defence systems). However, these are highly likely not in any serviceable state. They are decades old & have not been refurbished. Missiles have expiry dates & they have passed. These are complex systems. Germany shipped Ukraine 2700 Strela-2M missiles (former East Germany/GDR stock) in early March 2022. 700 were malfunctional on arrival.
Guyana’s storage is vastly inferior to that of Germany. For a long time the Strela-2M was not seen in Ukrainian service. However, since then they have formed a niche role as a relatively cost effective way to counter Shahed-131/136 (Geran-1/ 2) OWA UAV. Recent reports state that the Shahed-136 costs up to 200k USD per unit. Ukrainian troops attach thermals to their Strela-2M to improve their effectiveness. Against aircraft the kill ability of the Strela-2/M is very weak. The Strela is vulnerable to jammers, decoys, has an inferior targeting hemisphere, & has a poor head on ability. Hamas & other Palestinian terrorist groups use them against Israeli aircraft to no success. During the War of Attrition Egyptian forces using the Strela-2 scored numerous hits but much fewer kills. Israel countered the threat by adding exhaust long pipes to their aircraft. The missile would target the pipe not the engine. Through the decades the vast majority of the kills were helicopters or attack aircraft. On top of this, unlike more modern systems, like the FIM-92 Stingers, the Strela-2 cannot track ultraviolet radiation. This is why the missile targets the engine the most hence why it is poor against head on approaches.
On the flip Venezuelan air defence is solid. Russian & Soviet systems are memed however they still pose a threat. Against air breathing targets the medium ranged BUK-M2 & S-125 will be used. Against ballistic targets the S-300VM can be used. Even if the US directly intervened in support of Guyana. No ballistic weapons will be used.
Venezuela has a number of potent aerial assets. Regarding fixed wing fighter aircraft these are American F-16s, Russian Su-30MK2s, & Chinese K-8 light attack aircraft/jet trainers. Due to US & EU sanctions even if the F-16s can fly they will likely not be in a combat ready state. Equipment is only effective as long as there is maintenance & the availability of spare parts. No Venezuelan allies operate the F-16. These F-16s may be in a similar state to Yugoslav Mig-29s during the NATO bombing campaign of Serbia. Those Mig-29s had broken radar & faulty communication systems which massively impacted their combat ability. Russian President Yeltsin refused to give military aid to Serbian leader Milosevic. US-Venezuelan relations quickly soured when Hugo Chavez became president. He was anti-American. With this turn of events Russia became their biggest arms supplier. The Su-30MK2 is effective. Its Kh-29T & Kh-59ME ground attack missile can be used to perform precision strikes against HVTs. The Kh-29T has a range up to 30km & uses TV guidance (controlled by the launch aircraft pilot). Whilst the Kh-59ME has a much longer 200 km range. In its terminal stage (when close to the target) the Kh-59ME also utilises TV guidance. TV guidance allows for precision & target hit confirmation. Unlike other stand-off weapons where you only know in the aftermath if the target was struck or not. However, a disadvantage is that the guidance cameras are susceptible to fog & smoke.
It is unlikely the 9 K-8 will be used initially in combat as it is not needed due to the availability of the better Su-30MK2. Unless Venezuela wants to keep costs low. However, if the US or other powers intervene with direct combat then the K-8 will be pressed into a combat role. Venezuela ordered 100 PL-5E short range air to air missiles (AAM) for the fleet. It is comparable to the British Hawk 200 in combat capabilities. The K-8 can function in a direct attack role with dumb bombs & unguided rockets. However, this would be risky. Myanmar rebels have been able to shoot down a Junta K-8 with only heavy machine gun fire.
Air battles will be extremely lopsided. The only armament for Guyana Air Corp aircraft is crew weaponry. During Op. Desert Storm 1991 most Iraqi aircraft were destroyed on the ground or taking off. Likely this will be repeated if Venezuela invades Guyana. In comparison Su-30Mk2 can be equipped with a range of modern AAM. The R-27E, R-73 & R-77E. All are more than capable of taking down the Guyana helicopters & turboprop aircraft from a safe range. GDF has no jets. Due to Russian AAM & AD, Ukrainian pilots have become astute at flying very low to the ground to avoid radar. It will simply be too risky for Guyana pilots to fly. Su-30MK2 can fly at medium altitude all over the country & use look down shoot down radar. They will be able to detect the low flying aircraft & engage them. Low flying flights only work in Ukraine since aircraft do not cross the frontline. UkrAF aircraft stay in their controlled territory & the VKS does the same. Moreover, nap of the earth flights (terrain masking) are very risky. On multiple occasions Russian Su-25 aircraft have clipped powerlines & crashed. Guyana Air Corp pilots lack the necessary training. Air force pilots should spend 200 hours flying a year. This does not occur in Guyana. Quality simulators can substitute for less flight times however again these are lacking. In the past a small number of pilots have completed basic fighter jet training in China at the Air Force academy. It is questionable why jet fighter training was given to an air force without jets. China has been trying to grow its presence in South America. Argentina was reportedly in discussions over patrol boats & the VN-1 entered the new APC tender (unsuccessful). Venezuela brought VN-1 APCs for its marines, VN-4 patrol vehicles, & a number of aircraft including Y-8F 100 transports.
In a war just against Guyana the biggest threat to Su-30MK2 is friendly fire. A sizable proportion of Russian air losses is due to friendly fire. Poor communication between units & trigger happy/paranoid air defence crews are the primary reasons for such shoot downs. The amount of paranoia is dependent on the political atmosphere during tension or war. If the US promises to directly get involved, if there is a commonwealth coalition created, if Brazil pledges intervention then they will be very paranoid. If the political atmosphere is no direct help only Ukraine style aid then air defence crews will be a lot less paranoid. Regarding inter-unit communication Venezuela does have an issue with this. The issues could be further exacerbated by the US flying EW (electronic warfare) missions. These flights can jam communication & spoof radar from a distance. US carrier strike groups operate the EA-18G Growler (based on the F/A-18 Super Hornet), whilst the US Air Force operates F-16CJ (based on F-16) & EC-130H (based on C-130). Again, for the USAF aircraft aerial refuelling from KC-135s will be necessary. This is a very powerful trio of offensive electronic warfare. These missions albeit not a direct attack do carry a lot more political weight if the US commences them. Venezuela will highly likely not respond as this would provoke a full blown US-Venezuelan war of which the US will win.
The issue with Guyana getting more helicopters & aircraft from the US is because this is not ideal. The small geographical size of Guyana means that there are not many airfields which will be suitable to host these aircraft. This will mean they will be concentrated & easier to take out. NATO forces especially Germany during the cold war practised landing & taking off landing from highways. Guyanese road infrastructure is poor. This will not be possible. VTOLs would be an alternative however these are expensive, high maintenance & require a very large number of troops to use. It is not just the pilot but the mechanics, air controllers, rearmers & refuellers, forward observers etc. It will make more sense for Guyana to get Stinger MANPADS (FIM-92) , Javelins (FGM-148), AT4s, mortars, optics, body armour, helmets, small arms, secure radios, ammo etc. Guyana getting drones makes sense. The radar is small battlefield surveillance radar, yes that will be good. Reduce the number of recce patrols needed & allow for the limited troops to be properly concentrated. If its stationary air surveillance radar such as the AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel this does not make sense. When turned on they will be a large electromagnetic spectrum signature. This will allow for it to be targeted via long range artillery or via aircraft. Air surveillance being done via Brazil & the US makes more sense. However, GDF command posts & command/control systems will need to be massively upgraded. Live feeds & reports need to be quickly exchanged between Guyana & allies then within the GDF.
Weather:
Guyana has a wet tropical climate all year round however there are two main rainy seasons: November to January & May to July. Strong fog in these months does impact civilian aviation so it will impact TV guided weapons unless there are integrated thermals or millimetric wave active radar. It is highly likely that any invasion will take place outside of these months. Guyana is particularly vulnerable to climate change. There are cases of sudden heavy rain fall outside of these ‘extra rainy months’. During the rainy months the road network around Guyana is especially risky to use. The roads & driving are generally of poor quality. The population of Guyana is mostly situated in a linear fashion along the coast. Here is where the road network is best. Even though the roads in this region, especially Georgetown, are paved they contain many cracks & pot holes. Heading towards the interior the proportion of paved roads decreases considerably. It is mainly dirt tracks; with rain it turns into slush. Ukrainian
Possible invasion date:
Estimating invasion dates is hard; it is even harder without having access to intelligence reports. On the basis western intelligence was able to predict the actions of the Russian Armed Forces they should be able to predict the actions of Venezuela. To predict a date you need to think like the Venezuelan high command & their allies. Taking into account previous weather & politics it can be narrowed down. However, Venezuela has not picked a date yet for their not free nor fair elections. They are due sometime in 2024. It can be confidently assumed that the 2024 Venezuela elections will be fraudulent. There will be protests & strong opposition so banking on nationalism and the invasion will maintain the status quo. One of the reasons why Argentina invaded the Falklands was to calm anti junta protests & riot. Invasions sometimes occur on specific days for symbolic effect or to aid in military operations. In 1973 Egypt, Syria & other Arab allies invaded Israel on Yom Kippur. This is the holiest day in Judaism. This meant many troops were on leave & reserves were all at home. This meant Israel was on the backfoot & suffered initial heavy losses.
Certain specific days include:
Guyana’s Republic Day: 23rd February. The Army will be parading, army & political elites will be together in the capital, & the general populous will be celebrating. Like Israel during the October War, Guyana will be on the backfoot. Their army will not be in a combat ready state, alcohol intake would make the reservists temporarily unfit & the accumulation of troops would result in devastating losses in case of strikes. Strikes on troops during ceremonies have killed 100s of Ukrainian & Russian troops. Sadly on the 3rd of November this year, a Russian strike hit the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade during an Artillery Day ceremony. Unfortunately 19 soldiers died & more injured including some of the unit's best gunners. The brigade commander has been suspended & faces a court martial. This ceremony went against Ukrainian Army regulation. Invading on Republic Day would have extra morale damage. This is also the day before the 2 year anniversary for the full scale invasion of Ukraine.
Venezuela Independence Declaration Day: April 19th. April 19th 1810 a revolution occurred in Caracas with the aim of removing Spanish colonial rule. This started the Venezuelan war of independence. Maduro, banking again on nationalism may elect to start their war against Guyana on this special day.
Dates linked to the war of independence are other possibilities:
- February 28th: Battle of Cucuta 1813 & Battle of San Mateo 1814, both important victory led by Bolivar
- April 2nd: Battle of Las Queseras del Medio,
- April 11th: Battle of San Felix,
Of course Guyana will be more weary of invasion on these dates & hence any attack will not come as much as a surprise. However, due to the vast strength differences between the two countries then to Venezuela it is not much of a risk. The risk of internal unrest is greater than the risk Guyana poses.
Coastal defence:
Like air defence this is another major concern for Guyana. Guyana has a very weak navy. Comprising only a handful of patrol boats which are not always equipped with heavy weaponry. Their flagship GDFS Essequibo is broken. The most effective patrol craft in service are 8 US made Metal Shark boats with a 9th under construction. Due to the high risk posed by Venezuelan ships & naval assets they will be relegated to riverine & littoral operations only. The GDF has no maritime surveillance radar or effective patrol capabilities. Again however this can be filled in by allies providing support like with air surveillance. US submarines, vessels & maritime patrol aircraft can provide detailed reports on all Venezuelan activities. The 4th fleet is well astute at tracking narco submarines so tracking major surface vessels will be considerably simpler. During the sinking of the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship Moskva by Ukrainian Neptune missiles. An American P-8A Poseidon aircraft was patrolling in the area. The US states no involvement in the sinking.
Most fatefully Guyana has no anti-ship capabilities. Most commonly navies use anti-ship missiles. These can either be fired from ships (e.g. Harpoon), aircraft (e.g. AGM-158C) or from land based launchers (e.g. naval strike missile). It is extremely unlikely any military would sell/transfer Guyana large anti-ship missiles (100 kg warhead +), the reason being the risk of them being captured if Guyana is overrun. A land based battery would suit Guyana best. Easier to relocate, camouflage & hide. Aircraft would be too risky to fly as previously mentioned. Hit & run tactics with missile mounted patrol boats is plausible. In essence this is Finnish naval tactics. However, there are stark differences between the Guyana & Finnish coast. Coast of Guyana is relatively flat, thin, sandy & it curves around smoothly. The Finnish coast is much longer, it is rocky & highly jagged with many islands & inlets. Places to hide & wait from. Guyana has in comparison many fewer islands. The boats will have nowhere to hide especially with uncontested air space.
Ukrainian Forces have used ad hoc ATGM to hit naval vessels. In Mariupol (City of Mary, which is now in ruins due to the Russian Armed Forces) a Raptor class patrol boat was damaged by a Stugna P. The Swedish Robot 17 designed by Bofors (now BAE) is a dedicated light weight anti-ship system based on the American Hellfire. Able to be carried on foot & set up by a small crew. The warhead is only 9 kg. It is not powerful enough to sink a large vessel unless ammunition is hit or a large fire is started. However, it would be able to perform mobility & mission kills if a specific area of the ships were hit (bridge, radar, communication etc). Against small landing craft & amphibious AFV it would be effective.
A more unconventional approach becoming a military norm would be the usage of sea drones. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are masters of drone usage. They are the first military in the world to create a dedicated drone branch. Due to the dire situation regarding ammunition the importance of drones has increased. These drones can be equipped with large warheads, satellite communication systems & different types of optics. A Ukrainian wolf pack formed by MAGURA V5 drones sank the Tarantul-II corvette Ivanovets after multiple hits. Albeit not a drone the suicide attack on USS Cole shows that even the most powerful ships are vulnerable to small, fast moving vessels with a limited signature. Drones are cost effective. For Guyana they can be operated from the beach by a small crew which can be relocated quickly for survivability movements. They are easier to maintain compared to anti-ship missiles & tracking a drone launch is vastly more difficult than detecting an anti-ship missile launched. The Black Sea Fleet do fear the drones & vessels have been continuously relocated backwards.
One of the hardest parts of combat…seeing the enemy:
Quite often during combat you cannot see the enemy who is trying to kill you. You only know the general area. The movie ‘Forrest Gump’ was praised by veterans as being accurate due to no enemies being portrayed during the ambush scene. Like Vietnam, the majority of Guyana is dense tropical forest. This makes it even harder to spot enemies. Further compounding this issue is the poor state of optics in the GDF. There is a critical lack of optics. Infantry, including 31 Special Forces, are not issued with optics routinely. Optics given to sniper units are vastly antiquated. Thermals & night vision are extremely rare. In comparison every British Army infantry reservist is equipped with multiple types of day & night sights. In the GDF laser range finders are basically non-existent. Even on night patrol exercises with foreign militaries night vision is not issued. Initial aggressive action by Venezuela will be done at night. The defending troops will be effectively blind. This will increase ammunition consumption & lower morale. Yes, the average Venezuelan infantryman does not have a scope however the special forces & specialist troops do.
Discrepancies in junior command:
Junior command is the backbone of tactical leadership. High command set doctrine, strategies & overall objectives however junior command is what plans & executes the battle plans. Junior command needs to be adaptable, professional & be able to take the initiative. The resounding success of Eagle & Ghost Troop at the Battle of 73 Easting (1991 Op. Desert Storm) was due to Captain HR McMaster, of Eagle Troop, decision to disregard regimental orders. Ordering the troops under his command to bypass the 70 easting advance limit & bring the battle to the Iraqis. The issue with the GDF is that there are multiple different commissioning courses for the same role. Infantry officers can be trained at RMA Sandhurst (UK), Caribbean Military Academy (Jamaica), Colonel Ulric Pilgrim Officer Cadet School (Guyana). First two are highly professional & rigorous command schools. The local Guyana cadet school is questionable & has a high dropout rate. There is a lack of live fire & large realistic exercises in the local cadet school. The quality & amount of training is far less. Albeit this has improved. However, the officers will have different abilities, think differently & the command atmosphere will vary between units. This is not ideal for unit interoperability. Units need to act seamlessly. The Russian Armed Forces train junior lieutenants at a multitude of different command schools however they are according to their specialties. Ryazan for VDV, Kazan for tankers, Yekaterinburg for artillery etc. This works. Foreign advisors & instructors can help promote & develop the Colonel Ulric Pilgrim Officer Cadet School. Ukraine with the help of NGOs & America was able to quickly develop a platoon & captains course for TDF (Territorial Defence Forces) officers.
Alongside junior command NCOs are vital. In the British Army NCOs both senior & junior have critical roles. The most basic structure is the 8 soldier section. Split into 2, 4 troop fire teams (Charlie & Delta). Overall command is by a corporal in Charlie Team & the 2IC lance corporal commands Delta Team. Even the corporal has the power to take initiative. They plan their own battle tactics. This is key. Corporals are well experienced, more experienced than a fresh 2nd Lt platoon commander. The 2IC is in charge of admin of the section & if the Corporal is KIA/WIA they will immediately take over. All soldiers should be able to perform the role which is one above them just in case. Many countries around the world do not understand the strength of a solid NCO corp. It was discussed in the Taiwan report how China is trying to quickly develop this area. The lack of Russian Army NCOs is one of the many reasons for their numerous failures in Ukraine. Russian units are on the most part disorganised, lacking morale & have rigid & poor tactics. Ukrainian units do have morale & tactical issues of their own. Good relations between NCO & officers is important. As NCOs started as the most junior soldiers in their unit they have a closer relation to the troops & represent them more. The former chief sergeant of the Ukrainian 47th Brigade resigned citing the incompetence of certain officers & the overall disregard for the role of sergeants. This thinking is very detrimental. Sergeants are solid soldiers who have banks of knowledge. Platoon commanders fresh from command school rely massively on their platoon sergeants. Across all armies there is an elitism divide between enlist & officer to some extent.
If war with Venezuela starts, conscription will be difficult not only for the lack of equipment but also for not enough officers & NCOs. The Russian had cadre units. The third battalion of each brigade was reserved for training & mobilisation. They had an unusually high number of officers. This allowed for the swelling in size of the unit in case of major conflict. Russia made the fatal mistake of deploying these units to Ukraine a few months after the full scale invasion. Mobilisation would not be declared for many months after these decisions. These 3rd battalions suffered heavy losses, especially officer losses. So when mobilisation was declared in September 2022 it was an absolute mess for the first couple of months. Guyana needs cadre units & to increase the number of NCOs. This will increase costs however it is very much necessary. The British Armed Forces have a system where former regulars are
Morale & purpose:
Morale is important however it is not a simple dynamic to gauge. Russian morale is low, they are underequipped, underpaid & there is high levels of maltreatment (theft, assault, corruption etc). In theory it would be expected there would have been a large scale mutiny or so. However, there has not been. Fragging incidents do occur albeit. A key reason for this loyalty is the religious & propaganda given to Russian troops. Assault troops are given little books about all the ‘sinful things’ done by Ukraine & the west. They are led to believe they are stopping NATO & building a greater Russia for Russian speakers. None of that is true. Additionally, the actions done by angry troops date back to the Tsarist times. It is common for Russian troops to post videos on social media addressed to ‘Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin’ . They are angry at their units but not him. They request his assistance normally in terms of pay & ammo. There is a false sense of belief that he cares for them & the only reason why these bad things are happening is because he does not know. There is a true cult personality style around his leadership. Maduro does have a personality around him but not to the same degree. The legacy of the Tsar still lives on. Due to the perceived weakness of the GDF it is unlikely any large Venezuelan unit will refuse to fight.
Guyana & Venezuela are very different countries and this will help Guyanese morale. Guyana was colonised by the British whilst it was the Spanish for Venezuela. They speak a different language (English vs Spanish) & have different cultures & ways of living. So if Venezuela invades they will be fighting on foreign soil against an enemy which wants to preserve their identity. Language is vitally important. There is currently a civil war in Cameroon over this in the southern border region with Nigeria. There is an English speaking separatist state under the name of Ambazonia. Cameroon is a French speaking country mostly.
Overall structural changes in the GDF have helped to foster morale. The army has moved away from politics & instead shifted to focusing on an allegiance of the constitution. Troops will need to put aside religious & ethnic differences to fight as one cohesive unit. The GDF works a lot with the local communities, especially in Infrastructure, & offers a number of programs/schemes for their soldiers. There is a flip side to this. If an army is too geared towards civil duties it will negate their fighting potential. For example under the GDF is the Agri Corps which provides food for rations & farm training. It is unnecessary for this to be under a military organisation. It is a poor allocation of resources, officers and soldiers. Important organisation to have but no need for military oversight. During the Great Depression, Army personnel were put in charge of the Civilian Conservation Corps, a flagship program of the New Deal by FDR. A program to give unemployed men manual labour jobs. General MacArthur (at one time in charge of the problem) stated it was impacting the readiness of their army.
Due to poor equipment, being outmanned, outgunned, & with inadequate supply lines maintaining morale in the GDF during war will be difficult. However, the GDF is fully volunteer & everyone who signed up knows this fully.
We hope for peace & a diplomatic solution. We support Guyana & the GDF with their positions.
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