Is the tank obsolete?

The short answer is no. 

Long answer: 

Prior to 2022 there were discussions over the future utility of the tank in a modern dynamic battlefield. Heavy tank losses shown in the media during the Russo-Ukraine war kindled rampant speculation that the era of tank led mechanised warfare is coming to a close. This is far from the case. 

Before Russia launched its full scale illegal invasion of Ukraine the British Army contemplated getting rid of all tanks in lieu of more cyber & space funding. High command wants a more mobile, lethal & precise force. Underlying all of this is a tight budget. Cyber & space are becoming increasingly important however this is for another report. 

Fortunately they decided not to dispose of the Challenger 2s. Instead Britain is looking into expanding the future fleet of Challenger 3s. The Challenger 3 procurement does cap the size of any prospective British fleet. Challenger 3s are heavily upgraded Challenger 2s. No new hulls are being produced. Current plan is to upgrade 148 & retire the rest/send to Ukraine. If Britain wants to massively increase its fleet such as what Poland is doing then buying Leopard 2s or Korean K2s will be the most likely solution. Whitehall will not like this as this would be the closure of yet another homeground sector of the British Armament Industry. This would be a move away from British Manufacturing & self-sustainability. 

A couple countries in the past have parted ways with tanks. The Netherlands sold their sizeable fleet of Leopard 2A5/6 after the cold war. Last solely Dutch tank unit was active in 2011. Currently the Dutch Army leases 18 Leopard 2A6s from Germany for usage in the Joint Dutch-German 414 Tank Battalion. However recently, due to experience in Ukraine Dutch staff officers are deciding if they should create their own tank units with permanently owned tanks. It is clear Dutch generals see a national security purpose with these tanks. A plan was floating to donate these 18 leased Leopards to Ukraine; however, it was rejected. Instead Denmark & Netherlands have co-financed 14 Leopard 2A4s for Ukraine from German storage. This will be a longer process. Ukraine has no time to wait for equipment to arrive.

Belgium Land Component not only parted with tanks however all tracked vehicles. Decommissioning Leopard 1A5BEs, Gepards, M113s (including local A1-B variants), A-IFV (known in Dutch service as YPR-765) & M109A4BE. Being brought instead are wheeled Caesar NG artillery, Jaguar recce/infantry support vehicle, & Griffon APCs (including mortar carrier variants). Brussels High Command will be having some tense discussions over the wisdom of such a move. 

What is a tank? Some journalists struggle with this often. Track + gun does not always equal tank. According to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). It is a heavily armoured tracked vehicle designed for intense front line combat. Must have at least a 75mm gun with a 360* traverse & a weight 16.5 tons (metric) minimum. 

By this exact criteria the S-tank is not a tank. You always have to be flexible. The other key point is that it must not carry infantry as its main purpose so this rules out vehicles such as the BMP-3 which is an IFV. The Israeli Merkava is unique. It can carry a couple of soldiers or a causality + medic in the rear. They enter via rear clamshell doors. It is still a tank since it is only done in an emergency & it is not its primary role. Numerous tanks have unusual features which add a unique capability.

All tanks can be put on the armour triangle. This comprises 

• Mobility: speed, cross country & countering obstacles

  Dependent on weight, track, transmission & engine power

• Firepower: ammo capacity, rate of fire, accuracy & the penetration/explosive power per shell 

  Dependent on calibre, firing mechanism, shell type & the optics/thermals 

• Protection: amount of fire a tank can defend against,

  Dependent on passive defence (armour, mobility, speed & interior layout ) & active defence (i.g. ERA, APS, blow out panels, EW attachments)

Heavy, easily struck, fuel guzzlers, cramped, mechanically unreliable, difficult to coordinate in numbers. 

This is how one could describe the tank in WW1. Yet it was welcomed as a breakthrough weapon. Shock & awe were the first German reactions when they encountered it in the 1916 Battle of Flers-Courcelette (part of the Somme campaign). An invention which could break the stalemate of war. Since then the tank has continued to progress & evolve. 

There have been numerous types of tanks however today the battlefield is dominant by just 1.

WW1 saw mainly heavy tanks & land ships. However, starting with the French FT-17 it was realised something more nimble & smaller is more ideal. Britain & France post war their armies had the idea of infantry & calvary tanks. Infantry tanks were slower & meant to support infantry with heavy armour to absorb the enemy fire. Whilst faster calvary tanks were to break through & fight other armoured units. Also known as cruiser tanks. This idea did not last beyond the second world war. 

WW2 saw the usage of light tanks, tank destroyers & heavy tanks. Light tanks (smaller size, weight, armour & generally reduced armament) you would now call them these days Reece/fire support vehicles/assault guns (such as the M10 Brooker or the Fv101 Scorpion). These light tanks had better mobility & could go places other tanks could not go. Ideal for scouting & rapid manuvauers.

Tank destroyers were vehicles equipped with potent anti-tank/flak guns generally with only minimal armour. The idea was for them to not engage in tank on tank combat but pick off vehicles from a distance. Most armies do not operate this type of tank in a classical sense. Germany for example retired its KaJaPa tank destroyers in 1991. Russia operates the 2S25 125mm tank destroyers however it has never been seen in Ukraine. This illustrates how the Russian high command does not value its potential. Russian army would rather allocate resources, crews & ammunition to vehicles with higher chances of survival.

Tank destroyers do still exist doctrinally today however these are now ATGM (anti-tank guided missile) equipped vehicles such as the Shturm-S, Wiesel (Milan variant) or Fv102 Striker. These are wheeled or tracked vehicles with typically minimal to moderate armour which contain launchers for long range anti-armour missiles. Due to major advancements in portable infantry anti-tank weaponry, tank destroyers have been sidelined by anti-tank squads/platoons. E.g, the Fv102 was replaced in British service in the early 2000s by the FGM-148 (Javelin). For example the Shturm-S has a range of 5km & when it was designed the Soviet issue portable ATGM was the 9M14 with a range of only 3km. However, current Russian issue Kornets can go up to 10km. The vehicle borne ATGM then brought a new dimension however now it does not.

However, there is now a second resurgence of the tank destroyer. This time with fire & forget smart munitions. Britain has developed vehicles with the Brimestone missile (Wolfram). Poland is procuring a fleet of tank destroyers (Ottokar-Brozoza) with these munitions. Ukrainian armed forces currently use them on Jerry rigged trucks & Wolfram. At a minimum they have two confirmed Russian tank kills actual number is higher. Ukraine does not discuss its deployment often. The Brimestone uses millimetres wave radar to scan the battlefield to create a 3D picture. Targets are processed & algorithms sort them into priority. For Afghanistan operations a laser guided variant was added.

General purpose medium tanks were becoming increasingly more popular & used by the end of world war 2. Some of the most famous tanks of WWII, the Sherman & T-34 were medium tanks

Post-war the concept of the medium tank was evolved into the MBT (main battle tank) of today. Starting with the British Centurion in 1946. Bar a couple exemptions all tanks nowadays are MBTs. The MBT allowed many Armies to streamline & settle on only 1 tank model in service at a time. This saves training & costs down on logistics. UK & Oman solely use the Challenger 2, France uses the Leclerc, rest of Europe (mainly) & Canada uses the Leopard 2. The idea of the MBT is good armour, good speed & good firepower. The Leopard 2 is the pinnacle of this. It is very good overall however it does not have anything world class. Apart from its beer carrying abilities.

Heavy tanks do not exist per se however there are wild variations between weight in the MBT class. A basic T-72 is around 44 tons whilst a Challenger 2 is up to 75 tons. Weight carries its own set of problems. You need your support (recovery vehicles & armoured vehicle-launched bridge vehicles) to be able to support your weight. A Bergepanzer 2 (recovery vehicle based on Leopard 1) would struggle to recover a Chally 2 with Theatre Entry Standard. Additionally, when planning routes you need to make sure that bridges & roads etc can handle the weight.

When away from the front tanks are transported around on specialist flatbed trucks called tank transporters. This has many benefits. It saves fuel, mileage on tanks is reduced so less maintenance/repairs are needed, tanks can damage road infrastructure & tank transporters are generally faster. The same goes for other large armoured vehicles such as IFVs. 

To classify if something is obsolete or not you need to determine if the current limitations outweigh the potential benefits. For the tank to take off in WW1 it took forward thinking officers & strategists to recognise the potential benefits whilst others were focussed on the limitations.  

Crews & doctrine: 

Without properly trained & led crews tanks cannot reach their full potential. Poorly trained crews give the tank a bad name. On the Ukrainian battlefield too often both sides use the tank ineffectively. There are many examples. Recently defensive lines after the withdrawal of Avdiivka were not properly dug in time. Unsupported lone Abrams were sent out to engage & try to hold the line. A couple were lost. It is also common for tanks to charge towards trenches without much of a plan. Still in 2025 Russian tanks are being sent out without infantry cover.

Most tanks are either 3 or 4 tanker crews. 3 if it's equipped with an autoloader & 4 if a loader is required. Some armies prefer a manual loader as human loaders are not prone to mechanical breakdowns & in case a crew member is WIA/KIA they can take over their role. The drivers seat in the Abrams is specifically designed so the driver can be dragged out & the loader climb into the driver’s positions from the inside. 

Being a loader is a physically straining job & it is not possible to maintain very high rates of fire over a long period of time unlike an auto-loader. Tank autoloaders are generally reliable (unlike the BMP-1 autoloader) & they can be manually loaded if needs be. However, this would remove the gunner from their firing station increasing the workload on the commander. Autoloaders allow for a smaller turret since there are less crew members to accommodate for so this presents less of a target.

However, autoloaders can be dreadful. Any Soviet tank including & beyond the T-64 has a massive inherent flaw. The jack in a box feature. When hit it is not uncommon for Soviet & Russian tanks to explode violently sending the turret skyborne. Hence the jack in the box name. This is since the autoloader design is a carousel ammo ring around the floor of the turret. Hence any penetrated hit near the turret can ignite a round which will ignite all rounds. This causes a major explosion & expansion of gas which pushes the turret up & out. 

The French Leclerc & Japanese Type 10 are a few western tank models with an autoloader. They do not have a jack in the box problem. Instead ammo is stored in a bustle at the rear of the turret. In case either tank is hit there are blow out panels. These eject ammunition from the damaged vehicle to prevent ammunition cook off.  Trying to finish off tanks with blow out panels is harder.     

The ammo on the carousel was stationed low in the turret to reduce the risk of it being hit, however being targeted by artillery & top attack weapons (such as the Javelin) negate this. Additionally, the low position of the ammo makes it vulnerable to mines. Part of the upgrade redesign of the Leopard 2A4 was removing the lower part of the hull ammo storage bin & raising it. This means it is further away from a mine blast.  

The Battle of 73 Easting part of Op. Desert Storm 1991 Gulf War is a prime case study for the correct usage of tanks by skilled commanders. Captain H.R. McMaster (later Lt General) was the commander of Eagle Troops during that battle. His leadership before & during the battle was key to the resounding success. 

Training needs to be tough & as realistic as possible. Sweat during training saves blood on the battlefield. Make mistakes during training not during combat. Before the unit advanced in Iraq H.R. McMaster ordered a night time training mission where tanks nearly drove into each other. They learnt & adapted. When it came to battle no mistakes were made. When practising tank exercises some armies script them too much which reduces the actual training value. This was a key made during our second Taiwan report. 

Crews need to be well disciplined & motivated. Being a tanker is a risky job. H.R. McMaster did remove a small number of soldiers who refused to properly engage with this training regime & mentality. This improved morale greatly. The previous commander of Eagle Troop, 2nd Armoured Cavalry Regiment left him with a number of problems to fix. However, he was up to the task. The commander can make or break a unit. The biggest fear of Ukrainian conscripts is being put in a unit with a bad commander. There is an issue with both Ukraine & Russia with bad commanders being selected & prompted. Tavria Group commander Brigadier General Tarnavskyi is a prime example. Commanders who have Soviet mindsets are not suitable. Soviet doctrine is rigid & not flexible. It was only a couple years ago that Russian battalion commanders had some autonomy given. 

When you are a tanker & at the very front you need to have the ability to take the initiative. H.R. McMaster did exactly that. He brought the fight to the Iraqis. Regimental orders were to not advance past 70 Easting. However, he saw an opportunity to pounce on an unprepared Iraqi position. So he took it, inflicting very heavy casualties. He was praised for his actions and not reprimanded. This is key. Post-Vietnam US high command knew more power was needed to be given to junior officers. The position of HR McMaster attacked had a tank reserve. The reserve component was destroyed still in its original location. They were waiting for orders to move out which never arrived. Ukraine is still suffering heavily from a legacy of Soviet doctrine. Junior officers have a much better picture at the battle & are more aware of systematic problems of which the army is facing. Young Ukrainian officers have done very well such as Dmytro Kotsiubailo & Kyrylo Budanov. 

However, most Ukrainian officers are afraid to speak out & disobey orders. Soldiers have even been reduced in rank or relocated for disclosing issues within their units with the sole aim of improving. This must stop

These are the primary reasons alongside inadequate western aid (especially combat engineering vehicles) for the failure of Ukrainian heavy mechanised units & western tanks in their summer 2023 counter offensive. Units were ordered to storm into positions. There was too much faith in their equipment alone. Defences were underestimated & pre-assault bombardments were inadequate. If units had hit a mine field they continued even if engineering vehicles were hit. Officers were scared to change course, withdrawal or take the initiative. This fixed mindset is the issue. Plans never survive first contact. They must always be flexible. 

Mines everywhere: 

Mine fields are a major killer for tanks. Anti-tank mines can destroy a tank outright but more commonly they detrack a tank. Immobilising it & making it vulnerable to being hit (from other vehicles, artillery or more commonly drones). The most common mine in Ukraine is the Soviet TM-62 with 7.5kg of TNT. Mines are typically set off via weight detonators. Some other mines can also be set off via command detonators or magnetic signals. Certain mines are designed to be activated by the first vehicle but detonate on the second (or later). This increases confusion. However there is a greater reason why this is employed. If there are multiple vehicles moving together it generally indicates there is a higher chance of a major assault or an important convoy so the mines should blow. This reduces the chance the mines just explode a random truck for example. Mines can be placed by hand but more commonly specialist equipment is used. Such as vehicles (e.g. GMZ-3), launchers (e.g. Zemledeliye), tube artillery (e.g. 155mm RAAMS shells ), rocket artillery (e.g. German AT-2 for MARS2) or even robots aerial or land based. Ukraine uses drones such as the Baba Yaga to drop mines. Both Ukraine & Russia use UGV to emplace mines. Regardless of how old a mine is. It is a mine with explosives which can do damage to any vehicle. Mines do not always have to make direct contact to detonate. There are off route mines which detonate away from the target. They form superheated jets & commonly use the Munroe effect. The aim is to target the side armour since it is thinner.

The fast moving delivery methods are the biggest concerns. Mobility makes them harder to scout/hit & hence counter. Counter-battery radars can be used to track projectile trajectory & estimate a location. However, often there are simply not enough to cover an entire contact line. Ukraine & Russia are both short to varying degrees. 

The Russian Zemledeliye is especially effective as it can drive to a target location (where an advance is happening), fire mines from a safe distance then rapidly relocate away. Reload & do it again. 

However, there are countermeasures such as mine sensors (such as ground radars) which can scout a route. Moreover, during night when the ground cools mines can be seen on thermal drones. Mine flails, ploughs & rollers can be used to detonate or move away mines. MCLC charge lines can be fired from vehicles or there are infantry portable systems. These are basically explosive charges strung together & launched in a line. They clear a determined area. Specialist mine clearance vehicles such as the M1150 Assault Breacher, BMR-3 or Wisent 1 can be used to help. 

Clearly shown infantry have a very important job when clearing minefields. Good recce is vital to any advance. However, the best way to avoid mines is to properly plan your route. Avoiding if possible is best but it is not always the case. When Russian troops launched their full invasion of Ukraine the most quickest & deepest advance was in the south. The land is flat & lacks physical barriers. The area is typically used for farming. This is ideal for mechanised forces, especially tanks. Moreover, Russian agents/collaborators within Ukraine were able to find out the minefields for the Kherson region. This helped the Russian Army a lot. 

Very modern vehicles such as the Korean K600 Rhino can detonate magnetic mines from a safe distance. It has a magnetic signature duplicator which produces a strong magnetic signal. The K600 also drops flags behind the routes it clears to guide vehicles & infantry. Once you clear a route it is important that vehicles stay within those safety zones. However, these safety zones do cause forces to cluster. Spacing is vital in the army; it drastically reduces the chance of you being hit.

According to the second protocol of the Geneva Convention mines should have a self-destruct mechanism but often these fail.

The hardest place to use tanks is in urban warfare. Built up areas give tactical advantages to the enemy. Risk of ambush is high. Tank infantry synergy is even more necessary. Tank crews do not have total all around surveillance. Infantry need to be their eyes & take out anti-tank squads. Chechen tactics in Grozny during the first Chechen war were based around small anti-tank squads. They would quietly move around & find a vulnerable target. Machine gunners would suppress infantry then an RPG gunner would move forward & fire shots. Multiple shots were fired (ideally from multiple RPGs) to counter ERA. ERA is a type of Active Protection System. They are bricks which explode when hit to reduce damage done. There are other types of ERA such as laser warners or hard-kill systems. Hard-kill systems such as the Israeli Trophy can be countered by firing multiple rounds at the same tank within a short amount of time. The Trophy system only has a finite number of rounds & the reloading takes a couple seconds. This is what Hamas & Hezbollah do. Russian tactics during the Chechen wars were very poor which made the ambushes easier. Large columns of vehicles would be haphazardly sent into battle.  The Russian Army now is not in a good state but from an equipment, doctrine & training point of view it was much worse in the past. SPAAG had to be brought in to help clear the way for Russian Army tanks.     

What makes ambushes on tanks more risky is that defenders often have local knowledge. They know how to navigate the city evading certain areas such as checkpoints, patrol routes & areas with high unit density. This was key in Chechen units retaking the capital of Chechnya Grozny during the first Chechen war. In urban warfare you can gain elevation. British doctrine regarding FIBUA (fighting in built up areas) calls for troops to use this elevation to full advantage & go up. Getting the high ground means you can see your enemy from above making scouting easier. Moreover, firing down on vehicles means you are hitting the roof area which is the weakest part of a vehicle. This is why top down attack weapons are very useful. Additionally, subterranean tunnels & passages can be used to covertly relocate troops & materials. Depending on the situation it may be better for commanders in an urban environment to have their hatches open & manly look out. However, due to the short engagement ranges in FIBUA the risk of getting shot is high so it is necessary to fire ‘buttoned up’ which drastically reduces situational awareness. 

Losing situation awareness or communications in a tank in an urban environment is disastrous. Driving in the wrong direction, getting isolated from your unit or disorientated all massively increases your risk of an ambush. In a field you can withdraw more easily if the situation is too hot & the freedom of mobility is much greater. Certain streets will not be big enough for you. Getting out of an ambush without rapid reinforcements will be very difficult. Specialist training for this environment is needed. Urban vehicle camouflage such as the Berlin camouflage is often not employed since it is not useful outside of built up areas.

It must be said however the tank is useful when taking cities & towns. The tank was vital in Wagner’s/Russia’s take over during the Battle of Bakhmut. Tanks were often used to blast defence positions in buildings at point blank ranges. Tanks need to be adapted to this unique environment. The British Army had a now cancelled program to modify Challenger 2s for usage in an urban environment. Creatively named Street Fighter II. Soldiers were encouraged to give suggestions which is a great initiative. Proposed upgrades included an infantry phone so key information regarding local environments & risks could be quickly relayed. A plough to move debris, more cameras for situational awareness (including ones capable of looking around corners) & a Brimstone Launcher. Unless it's clear enfilade fire It would be difficult to launch a Brimstone within a city. As you can see there are basic & more complex solutions to the urban problem. Other things necessary would be more IED protection since these are very common. Ukrainian troops when they withdraw they typically place explosive charges in areas Russian troops will likely occupy; these are now detonated once Russian troops take hold of them. More niece protection solutions are also available. In the Bradley (American IFV) Urban Survival Kit (BUSK) there is a roof mounted non conductive wire mesh which protects the crew & infantry from electrical wires. There is a risk of electrocution in urban warfare due to damaged power lines.

Food for soldiers; fuel for vehicles: 

Famously Napoleon stated an army marches on their stomach. For vehicles they drive on their fuel tanks. The term tank was actually a code name. To keep the project a secret it was listed as a water tank (container). The name stuck however. There are a lot of myths in this domain. Tanks generally have one of two types of engines: a turbine or a diesel engine. Diesel is used over petrol. The hydrocarbon chains in diesel are longer so there is a higher flash point (due to more IMF) hence it is less flammable. An important safety feature if you are hit. There are pros & cons over each engine type. Turbine engines are generally more complex (so more maintenance/repairs) & expensive (not financially viable for many armies). Gear transmissions are different between the two engine types. Turbine gears are more complex. The gears in Soviet/Russian tanks are generally very poor even in the T-90M. The T-90M has a reverse speed of only 4 km/h. This means when the T-90M has to relocate or withdraw. Generally tankers decide to prioritise mobility so they turn around & relocate. However, this exposes their rear to the enemy increasing the risk of getting destroyed. This happens often.

During Operation Desert Storm the heavy sand took its toll on turbine engines of the Abrams. The filters were inadequate for the Honeywell turbine in the M1A1 Abrams. Post war they were replaced & new manuals written. They are meant to be changed daily. From a logistical standpoint turbines are easier to resupply.  You can put in a turbine petrol, diesel, kerosene (jet fuel) & other types of fuel. Turbines do guzzle a lot more than diesel. This increases supply demand & cost. Most Abrams variants are 2 gallons per mile however it is improving. The newly released AbramsX has a 50% fuel efficiency increase. It is a myth that the Abrams only runs on Kerosene; this is not true. Australian Abrams exclusively run on diesel. Logistics are the backbone of any unit. Without fuel, ammunition, rations & spare parts you lose your ability to effectively fight. More effort is needed in the engine department to lower fuel consumption. In many tanks armour & killing potential are prioritised. This is most present in the British Challenger 2. A tank with very good armour & an accurate gun however severely underpowered. This reduces motility & caps the top speed at only 25 mph this is poor. 

Very uniquely in the Merkava series of tanks in service with the IDF the engine is located in the front. It acts as a last line of defence to protect the crew from incoming rounds.  

Other benefits of turbines are that from a distance they are quieter (not from up close albeit), they have a higher HP output generally so better torque & speed. Moreover, they are useful in cold arctic conditions. This is why Russian arctic units in their pre-2022 structure had turbine T-80s over the diesel engine equipped T-72B3/B3M army workhorse. e.g. the 200th separate motor rifle brigade (part of 14th army corp, northern district) has (on paper) a tank battalion of T-80BVM/K. Due to the aforementioned negatives of the turbines the Soviet T-80 did design a diesel variant the T-80UD (Ukrainian Diesel). These are stored in Russia in a very poor state. Since Ukraine will obviously not help Russia repair them. They have not seen combat so it is not possible to directly compare via combat the turbine standard T-80 & the T-80UD. Both engine types will stay in service for the foreseeable future. Turbine engine packs generally are of a smaller size than their diesel counterparts. 

A simple way to reduce engine consumption is equipping tanks with an APU (auxiliary power unit). When stationary this allows for the engine to be turned off however the electrics of the tank to remain powered (powering communications, optics & electric traverse turrets). 

Most western tanks are equipped with them. However few Russian/Soviet tanks have them. Utilising an APU saves fuel. Additionally, turning off the engine reduces the thermal & sound signature of the vehicle. Being without electrics is not an option so the only alternative is to keep the engine idle.  

There is a reason why the British Army separated REME (Royal Electrical & Mechanical Engineers) from the Royal Engineers in WW2. Being able to quickly & effectively recover vehicles is vital to keeping a unit at strength. Vehicles are becoming increasingly expensive & not as easily replaceable. NATO countries (bar the USA) lack deep vehicle reserves which can replace vehicle losses. Extensive Soviet era storage depot is one of the major factors that has allowed Russia to keep on fighting despite suffering very heavy vehicle losses. Recovery is one of the main tasks of REME (such units are known as force support). Often when vehicles are hit they are not initially destroyed. There are well known photos of totally wrecked Leopard 2s when Turkey advanced into Syria. What people do not know is that these tanks were hit & immobilised then finished off by the Turkish Air Force to prevent capture. Often Ukraine & Russia finish off damaged equipment with FPV drones or UAV dropped grenades. Troops on both sides when they abandon tanks typically do not close the hatches afterwards. This must be a SOP. Leaving hatches open means it is much easier to drop/fly a munition inside a tank hence negating any armour & the risk of cooking off ammunition is very high. The contact line between Ukraine & Russia is some of the heaviest & most intense fighting of the 21st century. Specialist armoured recovery vehicles are used. Generally these are based on the chassis of the standard model(s) of tank in service. In most simplistic terms the turret is removed with a crane & winch added.  

Recovering vehicles is a tough & dangerous job. Firstly you’re in an area where a tank got hit so inherently it is a hot area close to action. Secondly when hooking up the damaged tank you are stationary, exposed to fire & the process of linking the vehicles together takes time. Countries know this & are trying to rectify this. A hitch which is ‘automatic’. The vehicle only has to reverse into the damaged vehicle hitch hook. Removing the need for soldiers to jump out. Both Russia & Isreal have used them. Soon this will become the norm. With the advent of terminally guided kamikaze drones (e.g. Lancet, Herop, FPV racer drone) there is a high risk of being targeted during this process. Any time saving mechanism must be used. Thirdly when towing a vehicle the speed of the recovery vehicle is slower than normal. Again this increases the risk of being targeted. A combat tank can recover another combat tank of the same type however the speed is very slow. To counter this it could be explored to give ARVs more powerful engines with a greater output. Not the standard issue engine. This would increase maintenance, spare parts & fuel however it is better than losing a vehicle. ARVs are very valuable on the battlefield; they are HVTs. Not seen in NATO however Soviet doctrine would call for dummy turrets to be placed on the Brems (Soviet/Russian series of ARV). Ukraine has done this on quite rare occasions. Organic C-UAV units need to be added to force support battalions to provide area cover from recce & strike drones. Point cover can be provided by equipping C-UAV jammers to individual ARVs. 

There is still a place on the battlefield for tanks when used properly. During the 2020 Azerbaijan-Armenian war (Second Nagorno-Karabakh war) the deepest advance was in the south. Where the area is flat, open & semi-arid. The lack of geographical barriers allows for the deployment of heavy mechanised forces. Advances were concentrated along the main roads. Tanks were key to the Azerbaijani offensive. TB2s & Herap drones were able to effectively target artillery (key killer to tanks) & air defence (destroying AD allows for combined air & land operations). They were able to smash the Armenian line & break through after a couple days. Counter attacks were beaten back. Armenian forces were broken into pockets & surrounded. Lion Research Co condemns Azerbaijan’s aggression in both wars (2020 & 2023). Advances in the north were more sluggish. The key difference is the terrain it is mountainous. Far from ideal for tanks. Support from EW, artillery, aircraft, drones etc was the same. Without the fist of the heavy armour Armenia was able to put up a stiffer resistance. Armenian forces were able to inflict some losses on Azberjaiian armoured forces mainly via ATGMs & artillery which survived targeting. These losses could have been reduced if there was better coordination between infantry & tank units. 

Azerbaijan's standard tactic was to use drones to scout a position to attack. Combat & kamikaze drones to take out positions in & around the target. Then heavy tube & rocket bombardments followed by a powerful mechanised push led by tanks. This is an effective tactic. Softens defences & lowers morale. Key points to counter are to dig in beforehand, heavy EW to suppress drones & effective counter battery missions to reduce shelling. Armenia was lacking (and still is) in all 3. This tactic however does use up large amounts of ammunition so it is not sustainable in the long run. 

Both Ukraine & Russia use tanks extensively for long range fire. Mainly Soviet origin tanks. Western tanks such as the Chally 2 are used to ‘snipe’ targets however this is directly not indirectly. Soviet tanks have a secondary role as fire support with their HE-frag rounds. Western crews do not train for such a role. Tanks are mobile like self-propelled guns so they can do survivability relocations after fire missions. Tank armour means they can take more of a beating from counter battery missions than conventional tube or gun artillery. However, tanks are needed in their classic offensive/defensive role on the front lines. Relocating them to the rear will reduce the capabilities of front line troops. Moreover, HE-frag tank shells are weaker than HE artillery shells. Against a hardened target 125mm HE-frags are very weak. One immobile Russian tank was confirmed via video to take over 10 indirect shells to destroy. Additionally, firing the main gun at maximum range with full charge repeatedly will wear it down. Necessitating more maintenance & sooner barrel change. Putting a strain on logistics. Both Ukraine & Russia are short on barrels.       

This tank’s role is more well known however than the S-300 ground attack capability (wildly inaccurate & they illegally target civilians in Kharkiv often). These rounds according to manufacturers (such as Bulgarian Kintex) have a maximum range of 10km. However there have been cases where hits have been scored from further away. Drones are vital to correct these shots as goes with mortars & artillery. For a period of time it seemed that the Russian Army’s most modern T-90M ‘breakthrough’ tank was used solely for long range purposes to avoid losses. Utilising its good optics (thermal & night sight) & weather sensors to properly aim shots. Conversely T-62s & T-55/54 were initially removed from deep storage for the purpose of indirect fire. Consequently, it took a while for the first T-62/55/54 losses to come up on the oryx list. However, due to recent heavy tank losses & the Kremlin wanting something to show the Russian populace. T-55/54s alongside the T-90M have been pushed into assault roles.  

Are tank replacements viable: 

Ukrainian Marines equipped with the French AMX-10RC report positives & negatives. This is a wheeled vehicle with moderate armour & a 105mm gun. Effectively a wheeled light ‘tank’ or according to the CFE a heavy armament combat vehicle. They state the gun is extremely accurate (common accolade given to western cannons) & it is highly mobile however a key issue are the wheels & the armour. The Ukrainian battlefield is littered with mines & UXO. Ranging from TM-62 anti-tank mines to PFM-1 petals. The petals fired from canisters are particularly a concern for rubber wheels. Easily can they puncture & deflate. Drastically reducing mobility is a key feature of the AMX-10RC. Logistical trucks on both sides have to change their tyres extremely often. Ukrainian supply cannot keep up. Cheap non-military grade tyres Russia sourced from China does not help either. 

The tracked French Leclerc would not suffer from such a situation as it does to the AMX-10RC. French doctrine states when the AMX-10RC should be used & when for Leclerc. AMX-10RC is indicated for low intensity, where a low level of anti-armour threat is present, where mobility is needed & the political situation may require a more friendly looking vehicle. The AMX-10RC is well suited to its previous French deployments such as to Mali (Op Serval in 2013). However, the Leclerc is better suited to Ukraine. So far Macron has not sent any Leclercs however there were studies done to evaluate the plausibility of such a move. 

Tracked vehicles provide better cross country mobility. This is especially important in Ukraine before mud is frozen & after it is thawed. This thick, swampy clumpy mud just wrecks havoc. Large advances are simply not possible. Moreover, even if front line units could advance logistical units heavily reliant on wheeled trucks would not be able to. The mud is known locally as Bezdorizhzhya or in Russia as Rasputitsa. Rural dirt/unpaved roads are virtually impassable at times. Many wheeled military vehicles get stuck and have poor traction with tyres losing grip & aquaplaning. Even tracked vehicles struggle at times albeit less. General mud has dictated the outcome of many battles. It has slowed the movement of armies ranging from Napoleon’s to Putin’s. The Soviet multi-purpose tracked Mt-Lb reigns supreme in such conditions. 

Ukrainian commanders have been concerned about moving certain expensive western equipment such as the tracked PzH 2000 during such conditions due to the risk they may get stuck & hence easily targeted by drones. The risk will be higher in wheeled artillery such as the Caesar over the tracked Panzerhaubitze 2000. 

Additionally, closer to the front lines due to heavy usage of artillery, mortars & other weapon systems there will be more craters & disturbed broken up ground. Creating more physical driving hazards. Vehicle drivers need to be properly trained in such conditions in the most realistic way possible. Closer you go to the frontline the greater the necessity for tracked close combat vehicles such as tracked tanks. It is not possible to be able to have a solely wheeled army & call yourself an expeditionary force. Planning military operations with the weather is vital. D-Day was delayed twice until the weather was suitable. Russia totally miscalculated its full scale war with Ukraine. Invading in late February 2022 meant that spring was arriving with the mud season. One of many critical strategic failures.    

When crossing small gaps wheeled vehicles are forced to slow down whilst tracked vehicles can speed right over. Small tactical advantages such as these can dictate if a crew survives or not in the heat of battle.

Certain challenges faced by tanks in WW1 are still encountered on the battlefield today. Impact craters are still a problem. Artillery exists; they blow up the ground and create a divot. Tank drives in & is immobilised. How to reduce this is proper driver training, improved driver situational awareness & good communications with other supporting units which could be able to guide. Intel on the type of terrain is crucial. 

When it comes to situational awareness people talk about the gunner & the commander but not the driver as often. If the tank drives into the wrong place or gets stuck then the vehicle is combat ineffective. Drivers need thermal & night vision sights as well. Only way to free a stuck tank is to recover it, which was discussed earlier as a risky business. This is an issue you can mitigate but never fully remove. Soviet linage tanks generally have subpar driver visibility. This leads to incidents where Russian troops run over very obviously placed anti-tank mines. Similar situations occur with other vehicle types. 

A modern alleviation would be having organic UAVs. BAE systems are exploring & testing organic UAVs released from the CV90 series of IFV. A miniature UAV can be released from a tank (modern version of WW1 tank carrier pigeons). These fly above the tank with a look down camera. Add a TV panel for the driver which can then see the terrain from a birds eye view & spot obstacles. Artillery craters are not the other obstacles. Others include trenches, barbed wire, Czech hedgehogs & dragon teeth. If placed correctly they can halt an attack & funnel the enemy into pre-planned kill zones. It is a misconception that tanks can just drive over barbed wire. They will get caught up in the track road wheels, sprockets & other components causing major jams or for the tracks to jump. Removing barbed wire is a tedious process. In the meantime that vehicle is combat effective. These obstacles need to be cleared by assault pioneers using explosive charges, cutters & other means. Mines & trip-flares can be used to further make the job of removing obstacles difficult for infantry. There is very synergy between infantry & tankers. Neither are at their full potential without the others. A mesh network system can connect the different situational awareness drones together in a unit. This improves survivability from EW with each drone being able to act as a relay to another & it builds a larger picture for commanders. 

NATO countries need to be better prepared to face expansive fortification networks.

Germany simply advised Ukrainian officers to go around minefields. When the entire line of contact is a minefield this is not possible. NATO does not train routinely to overcome such large obstacle networks. However, more training & exercises are needed.   

When tanks become outdated it is not uncommon for arms companies to propose conversions into heavy IFV. These vary in effectiveness & rarely are they taken up. IFV needs their own report. However, this is one way to reuse & recycle old tanks. More often than not old tanks are broken up for scrap, used as target practice or stored in deep storage depots. Tanks are complex machines that require proper storage. These storage depots vary from maintained depots such as the Sierra Army Depot in California. Picking California was tactical; the warm weather & relatively little rain helps prevent corrosion & other damage. Each vehicle gets a certain amount of maintenance per month depending on model & type of service. This is crucial in maintaining combat ready reserves. Whilst, in Russia they are generally stored in a field east of the Urals. This is to counter the CFE. East of the Urals is not Europe so CFE does not matter. Due to little care, hatches are left open and the insides rot. This is further exacerbated by the poor weather. It is common for criminals or corrupt officers to steal wiring, engines & other parts such as radiators. Officers rejected from the prestigious combat units such as infantry are sent to the logistical corps. They have a reputation for being ineffective & incompetent. The tanks typically require deep repairs if that is at all possible. 

Most armies must pick what they want to compromise especially if there are cost concerns. Some of the factors are dependent on each other. There are positives & negatives to the compromises.

A prime example is the Leopard 1. 1950s German philosophy was that Soviet advancements in tank ammunition made armour useless. So speed & mobility was paramount. The Leopard 1 is a highly nimble tank able to quickly relocate to new fire points however it cannot engage in tank on tank warfare since the armour is too thin. Ukrainian forces generally use them as accurate fire support of which the vehicle is well liked. 

On the flip side the Soviet designed T-64, T-72 & T-90 suffer from reverse mobility issues. Due to the transmission used the reverse speed is very sluggish at only 4km/h. When withdrawing from positions Russian tanks have to turn & have their rear face the enemy. This makes them vulnerable to enemy fire. The most modern Russian tank in service, a T-90M, was destroyed in this manner.

Soviet designed tanks (T-64 onwards) have an ammunition carousel design. The carousel is situated in the medial inferior part of the chassis This means only 3 crew members are needed instead of 4. Weight & size is reduced as well. This bring many advantages such as a smaller silhouette & reduced strain on infrastructure/bridging equipment. However, this ammo layout leaves a Jack in a box fatal flaw. When hit there is a sizeable risk of a catastrophic turret throw. This is where ammunition ‘cooks’ & the pressure blows the turret off the chassis. It is not possible to add blowout panels in this design. The Lelerc & Type 10 also use autoloaders however much safer rear situated bustle loaders. Both tanks have blow out panels as well. Blow out panels have saved Ukrainian leopards from catastrophic damage.

Modern telescopic & thermal scopes are commonly put on the roof of tanks. This increases the height of the tank & impacts the silhouette. Depending on the layout the optics may constitute weak spots.

British tanks have a notorious reputation for mobility & engine problems. Both the Challenger 1 & 2 are severely underpowered. Their speeds are less than allied Abrams & Leopards. The strong armour of the Challenger brings immense weight. In Ukraine Challenger 2s often become stuck in the mud & large armoured recovery vehicles are needed for the challenge.

The strong armour however is necessary into todays battlefield more than ever. Anti-tank measures are expanding rapidly. Drone corrected artillery & FPVs are two of the biggest armour killers. Moreover, ATGMs are only becoming longer ranged, more accurate & powerful. French military doctrine clearly highlights the suitable environment for the AMX-10RC & Lelerc. The AMX-10RC is meant for low intensity theatres where the enemy does not poses potent anti-tank weaponry. The Ukrainian battlefield has only amplified this importance. The AMX-10RC, RC meaning wheeled cannon, is a wheeled recon/fire support vehicle boasting an accurate 105mm gun. Accurate troops praise its mobility, hydraulics, & armament however it is vulnerable to attack. The armour is thin & artillery can pierce from a distance. Moreover, the wheels are often shredded by mines cutting the aforementioned mobility. This highlights the continued importance of having heavy armoured track vehicles.

The less of a compromise you want to do overall the more expensive & complex your vehicle will be. There needs to be careful balancing acts played. Each part of the tank & tank doctrine will be discussed in detail

Overall the tank is a mighty machine. Tank design & usage is not as simple as it may seem. A well built tank paired with creative & bold commanders, well trained crews, suitable terrain & support (drones, EW, infantry, recovery, logistics & more) is difficult to stop. They will smash your lines. They are the fist of any heavy mechanised forces. For the foreseeable future there will be a battle between anti-tank warfare & tank development. When anti-tank warfare is currently winning it does not mean the tank is obsolete now forever. With current information & analysis the tank will continue to be a main part of any effective army. Tanks will always maintain the psychological impact they have. Defenders will be demoralised whilst attackers will feel more confident since they are being accompanied by heavy vehicles. 

You need to combine the modern with the tried & tested.