Holes in Europe's bastion; Issues with the Ukrainian Armed Forces part 1

Holes in Europe's bastion; Issues with the Ukrainian Armed Forces part 1

To understand the problems facing the Armed Forces of Ukraine (ZSU) you must understand history. Ukraine throughout history has been dealt deck after deck of bad cards. 

Kyivan Rus’ is the origin of modern day Ukraine. This was a powerful state however issues were present. Power struggles between successors were common & state cohesion was dependent on alliances being maintained. Slowly it broke apart. Catalysing the demise was regional fragmentation paired with the Dnipro trade route becoming less strategic. What sealed fate was external aggression. The end of the Kyivan Rus was the siege of Kyiv by the Mongols. The Ukrainian People’s Republic declared independence in 1918 since then the modern Ukrainian state has lived through Soviet occupation, Nazi occupation, the Holodomor, 

Western Border struggles:

The eastern (Donetsk & Luhansk) & southern (Crimea) border were invaded by Russia back in 2014. The northern border, with Belarus, was used in the failed Kyiv offensive (Kyiv, Chernihiv, Zhymoyr, & Sumy) back in February 2022. The western border is free from Russian invasion but not problems.

Trade & blockade

Nearly all military aid & most economic trade happens via the western land border. Mainly with Poland. Russia knows that this land trade is Ukraine’s life line therefore attempts have been made to sabotage it. Moscow knows they cannot directly target the logistical hubs in NATO territory since this would be certain doom for them. Russia under no circumstance wants an Article 5. Patriot batteries alongside other air defence systems routinely protect key military airports & railways. The methods which the Kremlin employ vary from sabotage, supporting political campaigns to influencing foreign governments. 

Moscow has numerous spies & surveillance equipment in a number of countries keeping eyes on the armament transfers. Some countries such as the USA release full lists of aid they are sending whilst others such as Finland are tight lipped. Knowing weapons in advance means you can train & adapt tactics to counter them. Albeit Russia is notoriously slow at this. 

On a side note Kyiv has sent so called ‘wish lists’ of weapons & equipment to foreign governments. Often due to red tape, bureaucracy & fear of escalation there is a severe lag on what Ukraine needs & what they have to put up with. Ukraine has to publicly campaign for new weapons. This occurred with HIMARS, Patriot, Abrams, long range strike permission & so on. This means Russian high command is fully aware & can counter. Take the German leopard 2 for example. Biden & Scholz delayed & it took months for them to buckle. Scholzing has its own definition which means to communicate one thing (‘stand with Ukraine’) but to delay or prevent beneficial decisions. When the Leopard 2 finally entered the battlefield it was 6 months past prime. During the 2023 counteroffensive they faced tough fortifications & well trained ATGM & UAV crews. This led to excessive losses & a sub par performance. Poor tactics, command & not enough ammunition were also contributing factors. The defensive lines & minefields were mostly all built during this prolonged decision making time.

The same happened with long range strike permission. Biden prevented ATACMS long range strikes & told Ukraine if they fired Anglo-French Storm Shadow cruise missiles into Russian territory he would cut all aid. Biden must be remembered as the President that failed Ukraine.

In 2014 Russian GRU agents (foreign military intelligence), belonging to unit 29155, sabotaged a Czech ammunition storage site. The explosion killed 2 people & Ukraine was meant to receive the weapons. Poland has arrested a number of individuals including Wagner sympathisers. In May 2024 9 agents were arrested for arson & other crimes. This ring was not just in Poland but also in Baltic countries. Actions are not just limited to neighbours either in London a warehouse with Ukrainian aid was set ablaze. 4 were arrested for arson & one of the 4 is facing a second charge of assisting a foreign intelligence service. 

OPSEC has been an issue with the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Key information & locations have been leaked. location of forward deployments, troops movements, barracks etc. Ukraine also finds it hard to keep operations are secret. The 2022 Kherson counteroffensive

Logistical routes are kept secret & change often. This transfer process is rightfully not spoken about publicly. An assortment of NATO & NATO partner assets are used to keep this route safe. This includes AEW&C aircraft; Australia deployed a E-7A wedgetail for this role. Before full scale invasion supplies could be flown via cargo aircraft but now this is not possible due to long range AAM & SAM sites in Belarus. 

Viktor Orban, an ally of Putin, since the start of full war has officially forbidden lethal weapons to transit Hungary on the way to Ukraine. This restricts the number of logistical routes therefore reducing the area of which Russia needs to survey & collect intelligence. Slovakia, under Pro-Russian PM Fico, does not restrict arms transfers since this would reduce the revenue for domestic defence manufacturers. In his campaign however Fico promised to not transfer ‘a single bullet’. 

Since Q3 of 2023 there have been issues with border blockades. At different times Polish, Hungarian & Slovak protesters have been blocking roads & rail transit. Lorries & truckers physically obstruct roads & freight train tracks. Border crossings grind to a halt. Numerous agricultural train loads have been dumped; Ukrainian farmers have risked death to harvest grain. The bulk of the protests are at the vital Polish-Ukrainian border. 

There are two main points the demonstrators voice. The first is over transit passes. Generally non-EU truckers (such as Ukrianians) need special permits to enter & deliver goods into the EU. Due to war time constraints, the necessity for grain export & to prop up the Ukrainian economy the EU has enacted so called ‘solidarity lanes’. The requirement for the pass is not needed. Moreover, there are no tariffs or quotas. 

European truckers deem this unfair since it means Ukrainian truckers do not need to follow the same rules as the EU truckers due to different legislation. This means the Ukrianains can drive for longer with fewer breaks. The agreement covers only deliveries between Ukraine & the EU. There have been allegations that Ukrainian truckers are undercutting European truckers by doing EU to EU deliveries. The volume of truck crossing into the EU is much higher during the war but this is to be expected. 

The second point of contention is in regards to the export of grain. Polish farmers allege that the import of Ukrainian grain, which is cheaper, is very detrimental to them due to undercutting. The majority of Ukrainian grain goes to developing countries at risk of famine, however some enters European markets. Russia weaponized grain to induce an increase in food prices. This is part of their political warfare campaign to fracture & divide western resolve. Poland still imports grain from Belarus & Russia albeit in lower amounts. 

The importance of the solidarity lanes grew after Russia terminated the Black Sea Grain initiative in the summer of 2023. Russia started to target Ukrainian held ports & civilian cargo ships. Eventually the Black Sea Fleet was beaten back to port due to long range strikes & unmanned surface vessels. 

Support for the blockades came from trade unions, companies & certain political parties. The Polish Confederation of Liberty & Independence is a pro-Russian party which helped organise the action. A key demographic for them is lorry drivers. The official organiser for the protests is Rafal Mekler. He is the owner of a transport company named after him & a regional head (Lublin) for the Confederation of Liberty & Independence. Other key politicians such as Janusz Korwin-Mikke supported the annexation of Crimea & visited occupied territories. Another far right Pro-Russian political party which supported the action was Confederation of the Polish Crown. Regarding Slovakia the blockade of those crossings was supported by the party Our Slovakia. Again right wing & pro-Russian.   

Blocking major roads is a crime however authorities in Poland were not keen on taking direct action due to potential backlash. Police for the most part did not clear the trucks quickly, trucks stretched for 10s of kms. Nationalism is a common way to secure votes & domestic concerns needed to be heard. Judicially the Lublin regional court sided with the demonstrators in a key judgement. 

The blockades caused a major spike in logistical costs for Ukraine. Prices for goods increased & contracts could not be fulfilled in time. The delays were impactful for both imports & exports. The costs are in the millions for an already badly damaged economy. Infrastructure is generally less developed in western Ukraine compared to the more industrial east. This creates its own challenges alongside the blockade.   

There were agreements for military, humanitarian & perishable truck loads to be given priority but this did not always happen. Conspiracy theories were created to support the protests. For example a number of small patrol boats were held back in Poland as they were falsely deemed to be private yachts. As military transfers are kept secret the extent of the armament delays is unknown. However, there were tangible impacts for the war effort. A sizable proportion of miscellaneous military equipment such as solar generators, small COTS drones, combat beds, flash lights etc are crowdfunded & delivered by civilians. This was all delayed. 

Border regulations 

In regards to the import of crowdfunded military equipment there used to be other issues. Until February 2023 there was VAT & special permits required for drones, optics, night vision & portable communication devices. Like with the defence industries this unnecessary bureaucracy caused delays & incurred costs. The campaign for regulation change took months; much longer than what it should have taken. This is another example of the engrained old guard mentality. 

Corruptions used to be common for border guards. This however has largely decreased in recent years & the introduction of electronic queuing systems has sped up the crossing process.  

Moldova:

Like Ukraine, Moldova is currently shifting towards the west & the EU. Specific to Moldova they are moving closer to Romania as well. They are an ally of Ukraine. Parliament & society is split between pro-west & pro-Russia. The Party of Action & Solidarity (Pro-EU) has a clear majority. Moldova was granted candidate status to the European Union & negotiations have commenced. However, this process is marred due to its legacy with Russia & the Soviets. Moscow actively tries to prohibit western ambitions & attempts to cause havoc. If Ukraine was to fall it is highly likely Moldova would be next.  

The region of Bessarabia, which makes up most of modern day Moldova, was part of the Russian Empire. In 1812 it was seeded by the Ottomans after the Russo-Turkish war. The principality of Moldova was independent in the 14th century but later on came under the rule of a number of different more powerful entities. After the Russian Empire collapsed in 1917 there was a short-lived Moldavian Democratic Republic. In 1918 Romania & Moldova unified. This lasted until the signing of the Molotov Ribbentrop Pact. With the aid of Nazi Germany in 1940 the Soviets occupied Bessarabia & Northern Bukovina. The Moldavian SSR was formed & endured 51 years of occupation. These were key developments that form the societal dynamics of the modern day country. 

The Russian Empire when it took control started a campaign to Russify in Moldova. Russia is a vast country due to conquest. There was never decolonisation. European powers such as Britain & France conquered land far from home whilst Moscow advanced east. There are numerous ethnic groups such as Chechens, Tuvans, Buryats etc. To maintain central order & prevent ethnic fracturing there is promotion of the common Russian language, culture & practices. Administrative & education reform was done in Bessarabia. The Soviets continued this practice. 15 different republics made up the USSR. Romania however was not part of the USSR & Moscow did not want Moldova to unite again. Russian was promoted as the official language for government activities & business. Even though Moldovan is essentially the 

According to Ukraine & Moldova, Russia attempted a coup in February 2023. The aim is to replace the successful Pro-west President Maia Sandu with someone more appealing to Moscow. Disinformation campaigns have been launched by Russia since western aligned parties won the 2020 election. The UK is helping to boost cyber security in the country. A number of foreigners were arrested. Wagner Group, organised crimes & local oligarchs were involved in the planning. 

The full scale invasion of Ukraine has helped rebuild Moldovan security. The USA, UK & EU are working towards rebuilding the armed forces, increasing energy security & other pressing needs. European Peace Facility funds are enabling the modernization of equipment primarily in the field of air defence & logistical support. The US has donated equipment for special forces & peacekeepers. There are joint NATO member & Moldovan military exercises. Germany through their Enable & Enhance initiative provided capable Swiss Piranha 3H APCs. The first batch of ex-Danish 19 Piranha 3s were meant for Ukraine however the Swiss vetoed it therefore Germany paid for them to be redirected. A further 14 will be funded forming a battalion's worth. Swiss export regulations forbid weapon sales/transfers to countries at war. This includes reexports (aka Denmark sending equipment originally brought from Switzerland). Bern alongside vetoing exports also vetoed the development of their domestic arms industry. Countries are moving away from buying Swiss weapons & international manufacturers are planning new factories elsewhere. More work is needed for the Moldovan armed forces. The main points are similar to Ukraine, 1. Command & professionalism, 2. Training, 3. Inadequate Soviet equipment. 

Mobilisation:

Lack of infantry

Due to delayed mobilisation there are insufficient troops to replace combat casualties. The laws needed to reduce the conscription age to 25 & the electronic registration systems were pushed back. Zelensky was concerned about political backlash. Mobilisation needs to commence before there are troop shortages. It takes time (up to months) to assess, organise, train & equip new recruits.

Some brigades report that replacing troops only happens 20% of the time. Due to Ukrainian tactics & inadequate western aid casualty rates are higher than what they should be. This is massively impacting operational capabilities. Battalions are operating well below max capacity. Some infantry companies are only 20-30% full. Compared to volunteers, mobilised troops tend to be older & in less physical shape. The amount of training varies; unit commanders complain they have to do training themselves. An untrained individual is more of a risk than an asset. 

When battles, such as Bakhmut & Addivika, get desperate chefs, artillery crews & other non-infantry role soldiers are sent to the frontline. All soldiers receive basic training, such as weapons handling, firing & small unit manoeuvring however being an infantryman takes a unique set of skills & knowledge. These troops do not perform well. It is an unnecessary tactic which has never been historically proven to work. Replacing experienced specialist troops such as combat engineers & artillery crews is harder than training up infantrymen. It is a short term solution to a long term problem. Once the units are withdrawn it will be harder to regenerate combat capabilities due to the losses of clerks, chefs & other support roles. It is highly short sighted & history proves this tactic does not stop an offensive. 

Russian war crimes

Russian war crimes result in misery & devastation. Countless hospitals, schools & cultural sites destroyed. No distinction is made between civilians & combatants. Alongside targeting civilian infrastructure, & shooting non-combatants Russian forces commit war crimes to gain tactical advantages on the battlefield.   

Perfidy

Perfidy is the action of performing illegally deceitful acts. A common tactic performed is the fake surrender. Ukrainians troops do encourage & accept the surrender of the enemy.  There have been numerous examples of Russian troops surrendering & allowing Ukrainians to come near. This lowers the guard of the Ukrainian troops & then the Russians take out a grenade or a group in hiding performs an ambush. Both tactics are illegal & constitute a war crime. There are instances of the POW guard & search procedure not being performed properly by Ukrainian forces. This is likely due to multiple factors such as inadequate training, lack of a mature NCO corp & the positive atmosphere created by winning a fire fight & capturing enemies. 

Russia signed Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 1977 (Moscow did revoke obligation to Article 90 in 2019). Article 37 - Prohibition of Perfidy 1. (c) forbids ‘the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status’. It is not uncommon for Russians to abandon uniforms when they lose their positions. This is especially prevalent in the Kherson region. When Moscow’s forces fled from the right bank of the Dnipro some soldiers were left behind & ditched their uniforms. They remained armed. Russian troops change into civilian attire then slip away blending in with civilians. This means they cannot be captured or targeted as they leave.

Article 39 - Emblems of nationality paragraph 2 states it is illegal to use the ‘flags or military emblems, insignia or uniform of adverse parties’ whilst engaged in combat. When Russians are struggling to advance in a region often they turn to illegal tactics. In Pisky & the Bakhmut region some Russian assault units had Ukrainian uniforms. Likely these were taken from POWs. This illegal trick causes confusion & allows the Russian forces to advance whilst not being targeted. The Russian advance in Bakhmut was a brutal slog measuring mere 10s of metres per day. Wagner telegram channels boasted about how they ambushed & killed soldiers using this tactic. This tactic is hard to counter as uniforms are a key part of friendly or foe identification. Compounding the problem is the lack of Ukrainian optics & sights to identify small details such as the white armbands which the ZSU do not wear. Confusion is already an issue on the battlefield. There have been many examples of friendly fire incidents & soldiers on both sides running into enemy trenches thinking they are friendly. This illegal ruse of war helped Russia gain & exploit small tactical advantages. 

Truces of war must be respected. Since the first global treaty on the conduct of war, the 1899 Hague Convention, it was written that truces need to be respected. One of the earliest infamous war crimes of the war in Donbas was the Ilovaisk Massacre. After heavy & brave fighting Ukrainian forces were encircled but held the line. After negotiations it was agreed that a green corridor would be established & Ukrainian forces could withdraw safely. Ukrainian forces moved out of Ilovaisk and headed towards friendly lines as agreed. Cowardly & illegally Russian forces opened fire with artillery & tank fire towards the unprepared convoy. 366 killed, 429 wounded, 300 captured, 158 missing & a large number of vehicles & equipment lost. It was a major loss which had a tangible impact. 

POW

Ukraine states that not a single one of their POWs has seen a Red Cross representative. By International law countries must grant Red Cross staff access to POW camps. In comparison, the Red Cross, international bodies & journalists are allowed to see Russian POWs in Ukraine. There is a stark comparison. Ukrainian POWs are severely maltreated & there are numerous cases of torture. They are malnourished & require medical attention ranging from physical to psychological. This has multiple implications. Firstly it is the pressure & volume upon military medical services. Secondly, they are unfit to return to units & fight. This is intentional by Russia. Thirdly, these troops would have combat experience & would be valuable in providing training & knowledge to new recruits. This is not possible due to their horrendous time in captivity. 

Human shields 

To prevent Ukraine from being able to employ in-direct fire Russian forces have used both civilians & POWs as human shields. The UN has expressed concern about Russian forces setting up in locations in close proximity to civilians. Armed forces have an obligation to protect civilians. Locals have been rounded up & placed in basements or held in buildings close to positions. This happened in Yahidine in the Chernihiv oblast & it happened in numerous towns in the Kyiv oblast such as Bucha. 

Wounded POWs have been left in front of Russian trenches to prevent Ukrainian forces from being able to fire or assault. This is illegal on three counts. Firstly medical attention must be administered to POWs regardless of status (medical priority based on triage), once POWs are captured they must be taken to a safe area & thirdly the human shield aspect. 

Chemical warfare

The Chemical Weapons Convention, which Moscow has signed & ratified, bans the usage of all chemical weapons. This includes tear gas or pepper spray; what is legal for police to use may not be legal for soldiers. Russian drones, generally COTS Mavic 3s, have been equipped with Soviet K-51 hand grenades. They are dropped into Ukrainian trenches & other fortifications. They produce CS smoke (tear gas). Chloropicrin, an agricultural fumigant, has also been used. Compounding the problem is a lack of front line EW & Manpads to fully counter the drone threat. 

Performing an assault successfully requires a composite of factors. Before the engagement you need clear objectives guided by accurate intelligence & reconnaissance. During the battle you need empowered initiative based junior officers & NCOs. The correct equipment, supplies & close cooperation between units (command & fire support elements). Russia is lacking in all of these fields apart from reconnaissance & fire support. To counteract this chemical weapons are used. 

They are able to disorient & flush Ukrainians away from their strong point. It is hard to see, breathe & communicate. A chemical grenade in certain aspects has a higher utility than a fragmentation grenade. Zig zag trench layouts, sand bags, thick wood, concrete bunkers all absorb the impact of a frag grenade. However CS & Chloropicrin are gases they can diffuse across a defensive line especially when employed as part of a drone swarm. 

The Ukrainian army has a lack of adequate CBRN protection. There are not enough gas masks & legacy masks such as the GP-5 & 7 have flaws. They are Soviet designed & are notorious for limiting situational awareness. Trying to indicate enemies & defend becomes much harder than it already is. It means it is easier for Russian assault forces to occupy trench lines. Russian usage of chemical weapons has grown in recent months. The west has supplied CBRN in previous packages however not in adequate quantities. Luxembourg brought from industry 22,400 British C50 Gas masks for Ukrainian units. Alongside the mask issue is also the number of filters. Luxembourg only gave 2 filters per mask (total of 44,800)  

Conclusion 

Fighting an enemy that does not adhere to established laws presents additional challenges. Officers & soldiers alike need to be trained on how to counter & adapt to these problems. Intelligence & surveillance reports need to identify & counter breaches of international law. As Russia continues to be drained of fighting potential their desperation will increase. This drives the continuation of war crimes.  

Why has there not been a 1917 French Army style mutiny?

After the very costly second Battle of the Aisne there was a mutiny in the French ranks. Units would defend but not attack. Russian units have suffered immense losses; losses which simply would not be militarily or socially acceptable in the west. However, there has been no revolt. Russian units still advance but why? 

Firstly, the units which take the heaviest losses are prison units. Storm Z & V & in the past Wagner prison stormtroopers. Since these violent prisoners had long sentences in harsh penal colonies they were motivated. If they survive 6 months they are sent home with a pardon. Very few survive a tour. 

Secondly, there are harsh punishments for those that do not fight. They are classed as cargo 500 or refuseniks. Sentences include being put in an open pit hole. It is around 10 feet deep with a cage over the top. Few supplies are given. Other punishments are being tied to a tree & left for a while. Here you are exposed to the element & indirect fire. Normally if you are under artillery or mortar fire you can find cover & bunker down; this is not possible tied to a tree. Intercepted radio calls also illustrate summary executions or the refusal of medical aid to the wounded if they refuse to assault. Military police are highly disliked for a number of reasons. 

Thirdly there is propaganda & the role of the Orthodox Church. Each brigade has a political officer & team to maintain discipline & political ideology. This stems from the Red Army. Troops are routinely given speeches on the evils of Ukraine & propaganda books are given to troops. These books are quite comical. They paint Ukraine as an evil LGBT loving satan worshipping society. Ukrainian soldiers are portrayed as weak & led by NATO generals. There is a particular fixation on the ‘role’ of Polish & British generals. 

The Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarch (MP) is under the influence of Moscow. Ukraine banned this particular branch due to its clergy being used to spy & spread misinformation for the Russian armed forces. The head Kirill supports the war & provides moral justification. His sermons are broadcasted nationally on state controlled channels. Ukrainian troops nickname the MP chaplains as ‘combat wizards’ due to their actions. They bless all military equipment including tanks & aircraft.   

Budapest memorandum & arms control

No article about Ukrainian struggles is complete without mentioning this disaster of an agreement. When Ukraine gained independence in 1991 it suddenly had the world's third largest nuclear weapon stockpile. Nuclear ballistic missiles were both silo & TEL launched. 

The 1994 Budapest memorandum gave Ukraine security assurances in exchange for giving up its nuclear weapons. Russia promised to respect independence & sovereignty which were based on 1991 borders. The UK & the US promised security assurances & the Security Council of the UN would take action in case of aggression. The Security Council cannot take action when Russia is a permanent member with a veto. Tactically Russia had the council presidency when they fully invaded in February 2022. Bill Clinton, US President at the time, says he regretted pressuring Ukraine into the deal. Albeit these weapons are expensive & technical to maintain; Ukraine could have maintained a small arsenal. The number of nuclear weapons is not of great importance but rather just the existence. No nuclear state has ever suffered a full scale invasion. India & Pakistan had a war in 1999 however this was mainly localised to the Kargil region. The conflict was much smaller than previous conflicts in both size & scope. Russia would have had second thoughts before committing an obscene number of war crimes. 

In the years following the dissolution of the USSR the US sought to reduce the risk of conventional weapons falling into enemy hands. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program was initiated. There was funding for Ukraine to dispose of its Soviet legacy biological & chemical weapons. Alongside this Ukraine scrapped their entire strategic bomber fleet & long range missiles. 11 x Tu-160 ‘Blackjack’ , 27 x Tu-95 ‘Bear’, 60 x Tu-22M ‘Backfire’ were all destroyed. 423 Kh-22s cruise missiles & 483 Kh-55s cruise missiles were also scrapped. Ukraine lacks enough long range precision fires. The delivery of ATACMS was delayed for months due to political pull back. These requests have to be made public which negates a surprise potential. Moreover, Washington refuses to allow ATACMS to be fired at Russian land. Therefore, Russia has moved key targets such as aircraft (mainly Su-34 fighter bombers), storage sites & C2 nodes deeper. The refusal to allow Ukraine to strike is more effective at protecting the VKS than air defence units. So far requests for German Taurus missiles have been denied so far.  

Only Storm Shadows have been delivered by the UK, France & Italy. Albeit the UK wants Ukraine to hit the Russian mainland again Washington will not allow it. London does not want to risk a rift in the collective resolve for Ukrainian aid so will not grant permission without US approval. Donations of storm shadows are generous but this is full scale war more is needed. 

If Ukraine still had the Kh-55s & Kh-22 then Ukraine would not need to ask for permission to hit Russia. After the full scale war started, Kyiv fired Tochka tactical ballistic missiles at Millerovo air base in Rostov Oblast in February 2022. 

Due to the false sense of security created by these deals Ukraine in exchange for gas payment relief transferred 8 Tu-160s, 3 Tu-95s & 582 Kh-55 cruise missiles in 1999 & 2000. These weapons are now being used against Ukraine. 

The Kh-55 is a subsonic low altitude cruise missile. It flies at a height of 100m & has a range in excess of 2,500m. It can change altitude mid flight to maintain a low profile amid changing terrain. Directional course changes are also possible to avoid areas dense with air defence. Kh-55, which Ukraine gave to Russia, have been used with dummy warheads to overwhelm Ukrainian air defence. 

The Kh-22 is a very fast flying, more than 4 times the speed of sound, high altitude (stratosphere) cruise missile. It was designed to bypass ship defences & take out western carriers. Due to its high speed & unique flight trajectory it is very hard to intercept. Even with western equipment Ukraine claimed to shoot one down for the first time in April 2024. Russia has fired Kh-22 at areas that are not protected by Patriot & SAMP/T batteries. Ukraine does not have enough to cover the entire front & rear areas. Kh-22 have been used to strike 9 story apartment complexes in Dnipro & Serhiivka, a shopping mall in Kremenchuk & dams around Ukraine. They are not very accurate but can easily bypass defences. 

Ukraine does have locally produced long range drones which can reach Moscow however drones alone are vulnerable alone. Russian downs most but not all of them. Combining drones with cruise & ballistic missiles result in higher success rates. Each munition has its own speed & trajectory. Different air defence systems are designed to deal with varying threats. The S-300VM is designed for ballistic threats, Pantsir can down cruise missiles & the Strela-10 is surprisingly good against drones. A combination attack on Russian territory would be possible if the west did not pressure Ukraine to give up its defences. 

Under Senator Obama more funds were given to Ukraine to destroy more military equipment such as artillery shells & guns. Destroying military equipment does not bring peace when not every country does it. MAD is a valid concept.   

Defence industry

Ukrainian defence companies are experienced & produce high end equipment however there are numerous fundamental problems some of which are decades old.  

Bureaucratic & corruption: 

The Russian Empire & the USSR were both very bureaucratic. Centralised power allowed for control to be kept by the few elites in the capital. A lack of freedom & political innovation kept this rigid system for centuries. It is hard to break such engrained norms quickly. Ukrainian regulatory & public bodies inherited this cumbersome system upon independence. It is slow & prone to corruption. Defence contractors complain how long it takes to get products through state testing & procurement due to copious red tape. There are folders of documents that need to be done & numerous approval procedures. Physical seals were needed. This all favours the large companies.  

Procurement lacks long term strategies. In NATO militaries different equipment have an out of service date. This is when they are due to be upgraded or replaced by new systems. Due to historic neglect & underdevelopment of the armed forces this is not possible to have. Short term yearly procurements were the norm. The lack of strategy means domestic companies cannot plan long term. This is why the industry was export orientated. The stream of income was highly unpredictable.  

Reform is happening; wartime necessity has quickened the pace. Projects are announced publicly. Procurement is now more competitive with additional tenders; this reduces costs & bribery. Free market competition is key to success. The increased usage of the domestic ‘Prozorro’ procurement system allows for this transparency & reduces the amount of paperwork. It is an audited & open source. To reduce approval time there are new innovation initiatives. 

Brave1 was launched in April 2023 the idea is to turn ideas into finished products. It is aimed at small enterprises & individuals which before did not have a chance with the bureaucratic headaches. Brave1 priority procurements allow for testing in weeks not months as before. Multiple proposals are tested together against each other. Ideas & prototypes are proposed, evaluated & then funding is secured if approved. The majority of the Brave1 projects are unmanned systems & EW. It helps contribute to the Ukrainian concept for an ‘army of drones’. Some products such as the Piranha C-UAV EW are used today on the frontlines. Overall, unit prices for Brave1 creations tend to be relatively low relative to military products. Most grants are well below 6 figures (pounds). As the Brave1 initiative matures, grants are growing in size. However, for much larger projects such as for vehicles & artillery bureaucratic issues still remain. Brave1 organises forums & other competitions to stoke innovative solutions to combat problems. 

As Ukraine continues to move towards the west & the EU; spirit & norms will go with it. For admissions to the EU certain laws need to be changed, passed & criteria needs to be met. All of this will aid in the decentralisation & desovietisation of the bureaucracy problem. It is highly unlikely the issue will be resolved before the end of the war. 

Corruption was a way of life in the Russian Empire & the USSR. It was widespread & lucrative for officials. It existed throughout the social hierarchy from low level payments to speed up inefficient services to embezzling state funds. It was woven into the societal fabric. Breaking this has been an issue for centuries. Tsar Alexander II tried to eradicate corruption to limited success. Like the bureaucracy it was a way to maintain power. Doing nothing can be powerful. The USSR had one party, the communist party, it meant there was a lack of checks & balances. In exchange for loyalty corruption was allowed. This continues to be seen today with Russia. The Ukrainian defence industry has a corruption issue albeit not as bad as Russia. 

In 2023 there was a major scandal regarding the procurement of rations. The structure of the food procurement was Sovietly organised & highly exploitable. It allowed for murky deals & the food quality & quantity to vary massively between units. Then defence minister Reznikov was dismissed due to personal involvement. This is only one of many. 5 former/current officials from Lviv Arsenal & the state were arrested for stealing $40m meant to produce 100,000 mortar shells. In recent weeks an FPV drone manufacturer was arrested for providing 1,000 faulty units. 

Yes, a problem exists however action is being taken. SBU (State Security Service of Ukraine) & NABU (National Anti-corruption bureau of Ukraine) are the main agencies tasked with removing this issue. War has not stopped their activities; 2023 was their most successful anti-corruption campaign. Corruption increases during war due to more opportunities & attention being elsewhere.  

The replacement for Reznikov was Rustem Umerov. Minister Umerov equated corruption with terrorism stating they both spill blood. A major issue since the start of full scale war was the quality of medical provisions. Numerous fake/low quality IFAK & tourniquets were provided. An unknown number of soldiers died as a result. Major-General Tetiana Ostashchenko (head of the military medical services) was dismissed soon after Umerov took control.  

Quality control & reliability

Ukraine does produce a wide selection of defence & dual use products however reliability & quality varies. This harms performs & the ability to win tenders. Military equipment needs to always be dependable. Gaining a reputation for poor reliability & quality is a major concern. Ukrainian vehicles are often short listed for tenders but the majority of the time they do not win them. Due to this Ukraine lost the potential for 100s of millions of dollars which could have been reinvested & supported the domestic supply chain. Prior to 2014 the defence industry was highly export reliant. Corruption & bureaucracy have a role to play with the quality control issues. 

The most modern MBT offered is the T-84 & its variants. It has lost at least 5 different tenders & only has 1 export sale which is Thailand. During the Hellenic Army tender in the early 2000s it had one of the lowest reliability rates compared to its competition. Smoke grenades & night time optics failed to work. The Leopard 2 won the contract. 

Iraq ordered a substantial number of BTR-4s, a model of IFV, however the third batch was not accepted. The chief complaint was rust & structural damage to the hull. They were put into Ukrainian service instead. The Novator & Kozak APCs also suffered from reliability issues. V shaped hulls have been a difficulty to produce in numbers & to the classification standard. They are an integral feature of the MRAP class of vehicles. 

War has not helped with these issues. The BMP-1LB was created out of wartime necessity due to a critical lack of armoured vehicles for infantry. It functions as a battle taxi. It is a refurbished Mt-LB with applique armour, smoke grenade launchers & a RWS (remote weapon station/system). The engine is severely underpowered & can only crawl, again there are rust complaints & the RWS is prone to jamming. The RWS only contains 1 gun which is a 14.5mm HMG. Therefore, if that jams the vehicle loses its fire support capability. At least it does have adequate situational awareness with a day/night & thermal optics. Another system which had a rushed development & suffered reliability issues was an OWA-UAV model based on the Tu-141. The Tu-141 is a Soviet designed turbojet equipped recon drone. Ukraine inherited a number when the USSR dissolved. When full scale war was launched they were equipped with a warhead & a basic navigational system. Often they strayed away from their targets. One crashed into the capital of Croatia causing a small diplomatic incident.   

Issues are not just with ground vehicles & drones but also naval vessels. The Centaur-class fast assault craft and Gyurza-M class gunboat both suffered from developmental delays & teething issues. Issues ranged from propulsion to electronics. There was a criminal investigation for the Centaur class. 

This issue will not be resolved until the war is over. Removal of corruption & bureaucracy is a necessity. Soviet legacy machines need to be replaced with western designs. The best defence companies in Russia all have western equipment. 

Poor quality storage: 

Ukraine inherited a sizable proportion of the Soviet Armed Forces. A lot more than what the government was able to afford to maintain. It did not help the Ukrainian armed forces suffered from underfunding & neglect. Some of the stock was sold to countries such as Pakistan. The bulk of the tanks (mainly T-64s) & armoured vehicles however went into long term storage in Kharkiv & Kyiv. Kharkiv is where most of the military vehicle factories are located. The vehicles were not sheltered, given protective covers nor received adequate maintenance. They were placed in the open & smaller vehicles, such as BRDM-2s, were piled on top of each other. Broken & rusty. It was not envisioned in the 90s & early 2000s that Russia would invade. Therefore when these vehicles were needed post 2014 it took more time & effort to refurbish & modernise them. This is why troops are complaining of heavy rust with the BMP-1LB. Corruption likely played a role in their deplorable state. Guarding of the facilities was in the past dubious therefore theft was possible.   

What does not help is the climate. Kharkiv, which holds most of the tank storage, is hot in the summer, cold in the winter & it rains moderately. The US Army’s long term vehicle storage is Sierra Army Depot in California. The desert weather is dry & hot all year around. This reduces rust & weathering. Moreover, in Sierra the tanks have barrel covers & receive 10 man hours of maintenance per month. Consequently, the vehicles are in reasonable condition & can be de-mothballed much quicker. 

Political embargos:

Due to political reasons Ukraine cannot sell its products to a number of large customers. The Myanmar armed forces, known as the Tatmadaw, in the past brought an assortment of equipment ranging from tanks, armoured vehicles, air defence, artillery, & crew served weapons. There was a military coup in 2021 & a junta has ruled since. The junta is allied with Russia & Moscow is currently the biggest weapons supplier to them. Ukraine has suspended relations with Myanmar & voted in the UN to halt weapon supplies. This market is lost & it impacted the local defence industry. It is not just revenue but also technology co-operations. Ukrainian human rights NGOs played a role in Kyiv’s decision to change their Myanmar policy as some countries still traded until 2021. 

Another lost market since 2014 is Russia. The Russian defence industry is larger & more developed than the Ukrainian however Moscow was reliant on Ukraine for certain naval & aircraft engines. Ukraine is known for its engine manufacturers most famous is Motor Sich. Russia was Motor Sich’s largest customer. Motor Sich continued to clandestinely supply engines post annexation of Crimea & occupation of eastern Ukraine albeit much reduced. Since full scale war the SBU has arrested individuals trying to export maritime engines to Russia. 

Political factors have however helped the Ukrainian defence industry with the Turkish market. Ukrainian engines power Turkish drones & other aircraft such as the TB2. Due to the purchase of the S-400 system, Turkish actions in Syria & against Kurds there were US & European sanctions. Germany was a major seller who cut defence sales. This paved the way for Ukraine to take a lead role in the drone & aircraft defence industry. Turkey repaid the favour to Ukraine by donating & selling (at very cheap rates) large amounts of equipment ranging from TB2 to Kirbi MRAPs. Turkish drone manufacturers will set up domestic production in Ukraine. 

Political vetoes:

Israel

Israel has a very developed defence industry which produces high quality weaponry. Tel Aviv however forbids lethal weapons from being transferred to Ukraine. This includes Israeli made/designed weapons held by third parties. This reduces the contents available for foreign aid packages. Only non-lethal equipment such as radars, body armour & medical supplies have been sent by Israel. 

This is so interests closer to home are not impacted. Russia & Israel have a very unique relationship. Russia supports Israel's enemies,such as Al Assad, however Israel needs to work with Russia as they have aerial control over most of Syria. Russia & Israel do not want to have a direct confrontation in the Middle East. They are on opposite sides of many conflicts but they maintain direct communications so forces do not cross paths. However, Moscow does not have the reserves nor available expeditionary assets for war against Israel. There are other factors at play such as Putin & Netanyahu having a close relationship and a sizable proportion of crude oil imports are Russian.  

Germany & America has made multiple requests to Israel regarding Spike ATGMs. They are not asking for Israel to send any. The request is for re-export permission of stock held by a number of different NATO countries. When governments buy foreign weapons there are often clauses in the contracts which state that if they want to be sent/sold to another country permission is needed. Eurospike, a joint venture between Germans defence contractors & Rafael, has local licensing & production. Every request has been denied. Permission was asked in May 2022. Also in the same month reports stated that a Russian S-300 SAM was fired at an IAF aircraft in Syria. The missile missed however it could have been a symbolic warning by Moscow. 

The SPIKE is a fire & forget infrared homing anti-tank. There are short, medium & long range versions. It is accurate & can knock out all types of vehicles with its Tandem HEAT warhead. Hypothetically 100s to 1,000s could have been sent. It is much more effective than older generations of ATGMs Ukrainian forces are using such as cold war MILANS & 9M113 Konkurs. 

The NLOS (non line of sight) variant operated by the British Army, named Extractor, has a range in excess of 26 km. It was secretly brought for Iraq & Afghanistan operation as a counter mortar weapon. It was also used for precision long range strikes. Israeli M113 were used as the launch vehicle. It suffered from operational issues in the hot dusty weather but was overall effective. BBC crews inadvertently showcased the existence. It is now mounted on a trailer. It forms part of the Royal Artillery precision fire capabilities alongside GMLRS (M270B1)

Ukraine takes any weapons they can get their hands on. The Spike weapons would have been very effective in May 2022. More effective than now since Russian tactics have changed. In the early stages of the war tactics were very poor. There were large columns of vehicles tightly packed & urban assaults were inadequately unsupported. Officers were expecting an easy win with little resistance. There was a lack of Russian fortified positions & more armoured vehicles were used in assaults. The NLOS variant would have been very helpful since Russian mortar & artillery guns used to be placed much closer to the front lines. As Ukrainian counter battery capabilities have improved they have been progressively moved back. Additionally, guns are now longer placed together (the largest battery observed by a drone was 16 guns in one row) & they relocate much more often.  

Israel declined Washington's request for retired medium range HAWK (MIM-23) SAM batteries to be sent to Ukraine. David’s Sling is the replacement system. Sources state it would be 10 batteries & hundreds of missiles; these would provide a sizable boost for Ukrainian air defence. HAWK systems have confirmed kills against Shahed-131/136 OWA UAVs & cruise missiles. Protection of vital infrastructure is crucial to maintain energy security. The Ukrainian air force operates a number of HAWK batteries from Spain. The USA & Sweden have supplied missiles. However, the missiles are not in production any more which hampers sustainment. Not all missiles in reserve storage are likely to be suitable for refurbishment. Another system David’s sling is replacing is the MIM-104 Patriot. Israel operates 8 PAC-2 variant batteries. Washington is in talks for these to be sent to Ukraine. Patriot batteries play an important role in countering Su-34 fighter bombers which unleash barrages of UMPK glide bombs. Ukraine however does not have enough batteries to cover the entire front line & provide area defence for cities. More Patriots & SAMP/T systems are needed. SAMP/T is another long range SAM system however European & equipped with ASTER 30 missiles. Talks however have not progressed at least publicly. If MIM-23 was denied then likely so will the MIM-104 request. 

Kyiv has stated that providing air defence is in the interest of Tel Aviv due to Iranian weapons being used. Iran has transferred OWA-UAVs (Shahed 107/131/136/238) & multipurpose Mohajer-6 drones. Combat testing is the best way to evaluate weapons. Israel routinely comes under attack from Iranian drones so it makes sense to evaluate your air defence systems in Ukraine. Moreover, it would send a symbolic message to Tehran. Israel has allowed for drone radar & reportedly C-UAV EW to be sent. An unknown EW system used by Ukraine is capable of downing the drones. Tel Aviv has so far stopped short of missile, cannon or gun based systems. 

When the 2023 Israel - Hamas war started US military aid had to be split between Israel & Ukraine. Israel was using an immense number of munitions. This meant Ukrainian units were being delivered less especially in terms of shells. The aid is more vital for Ukraine than Israel.  

Another reason why Israel refuses to send military aid is so it does not end up in Iranian hands (equipment gets captured then sent to Iran). This is an easy excuse for government officials to come up with.

Overall, Israel is stretching their foreign relations as far as they can. Western support, especially from America, has been historically strong. America now is asking for the favour to be returned & Tel Aviv is declining. The power dynamics in the Washington - Tel Aviv relation is changing. They are trying to play a safe middle ground however neither parties are very happy. Aid is sent to show they care however they stop short at anything very meaningful. It is unlikely, without a drastic change of government, that there will be a sizable shift in foreign policy. Societally Israel does support aid to Ukraine however. 

Switzerland

Crime

History & current issues

Economic hardship drives desperation, opportunities & crime. Due to post-1991 dissolution hardships, crime skyrocketed, especially organised crime. This ranged from petty theft to drug & weapon smuggling. Crime subsided in the 2000s however spiked again after the 2009 financial crash. By 2021 it was the lowest it had been in a decade. 

Currently exact crime figures are hard to assess. Conflict brings criminal opportunities & policing difficulties. However, due to curfews & checkpoints low level crime has been kept relatively down. Crime increasing during war is a common occurrence; it happened during the WWII Blitz. During war there is confusion, mass migrations, destruction & delayed response times. Ukrainian Police infrastructure & equipment has been targeted on numerous occasions

The chief law enforcement agency the National Police of Ukraine due to war has increased responsibilities. They are over stretched. These additional roles include collecting evidence of Russian war crimes, responding to drone, missile, & artillery barrages, maintaining martial law, processing POWs & evacuating civilians. It is common for a few Ukrainian residents to stay in frontline towns very late on; even if they are facing constant indirect fire. Generally they are elderly Ukrainians. Reasons often include not wanting to move due to always living in that area for their life & not knowing where they can go. This means Ukrainian police have to do supply runs. Moreover, certain Ukrainian Police units have combat roles. This ranges from manning checkpoints & capturing saboteurs to direct ground combat. 

At the start of the full scale war, patrol & Rapid Operational Response units formed part of the first line of defence in the northern regions. As war progressed these police units were reallocated to rear duties. This changed with the launch of the offensive brigade program in early 2023. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (which the police belong to) was tasked with creating new assault brigades from its agencies. These include National Guard, Border Guards & National Police. The Lyut (meaning Fury in Ukrainian) Brigade is formed exclusively of volunteer police officers. There are plans for more police based units (reportedly 3). This complicates policing matters as it reduces police numbers. 

Before the war there were issues with the police such as corruption, underfunding & insufficient equipment. After the 2014 revolution the entire police structure was changed; the Soviet legacy Militsiya was replaced with the current National Police. Reform has been happening & improvements were made such as higher salaries, quality training with help from international partners, new police cars & sidearms. Arguably, due to western donations the issue with police equipment has improved. There are cases however of police officers taking bribes at military checkpoints.  

Crime impacts the war effort & is a burden on the state. There is a knock on effect through societies especially those that have already suffered. Poverty & humanitarian issues have been a cause of concern throughout the war. Certain wartime restrictions inadvertently benefit criminals. Russians employ a number of methods to guide their OWA-UAV & cruise missiles. Often they try to hack CCTV cameras to select targets, film air defence & perform battle damage assessments. The SBU imposed a number of rules in regards to CCTV. CCTV is the primary detective tool in today's crime fighting. 

Specialist assets & equipment could be deployed elsewhere. Instead drones, dogs & intelligence officers have to foil drug & cigarette smuggling. Ukraine is a hub for organised contraband transit. Even in the peak of war successful busts are made & interception rates increase. In August/September 2024 a joint Polish-Ukrainian police operation was launched. The largest drug laboratory in EU’s history was destroyed. 38 different locations were raided across Poland & Ukraine. 200 kg of opioids were seized & numerous organised crime members arrested. 

Weapons

During the Soviet era Ukraine was a major arms manufacturer & storage site for the USSR. After the collapse of the Soviet Union there was political instability & weapons went missing with control going to the mafia. Mainly they ended up in Africa in the hands of rebels. In the 2000s stability returned & the smuggling decreased. Cooperation with INTERPOL, OSCE & other agencies have helped massively reduce the problem. There are strict auditing & control measures. Both the EU & USA say that donated weapons are being used as intended. There is no evidence of arms being smuggled across the border. Russia spreads misinformation exaggerating the problem. Moscow aims to paint Ukraine as a corrupt black hole where aid goes missing. There were false accusations that weapons ended up with the cartels & Hamas. These are political warfare attempts to swing western public opinion against helping Ukraine. The overall picture is to fracture & divide. Fake videos have been created by Russia showing ‘Ukrainian arms dealing’ in Romania. As AI generative content increases in realism, deep fakes will be a risk.  

Every month the SBU & National Police arrest a couple of arms smugglers & release footage of weapon caches. Ukraine does not hide the busts. The caches are generally small and normally contain 5-30 different items; mostly of Soviet or Russian origin. Most of these weapons are captured Russian trophies consisting of ammunition, pistols, grenades, rifles & machine guns. Not as common but seen are anti-tank rockets & ATGMs. In Kyiv trophy air defence missiles, for the Tor system, were found. When Russia fled from the northern regions after their failed Kyiv offensive large sums of equipment were left behind. Those Tor missiles were left behind in Chernihiv. The same happened in Kharkiv after the Ukrainian Kharkiv offensive. Not all items could be collected by security forces therefore some ended up in criminal hands. Smugglers due to preventive measures are unable to sell them aboard so they are used in domestic organised crime. Uncommonly there are western transferred weapons in the caches. Generally they are grenades or disposable rockets typically of Soviet design. Firstly, these weapons would be useful to Ukrainian units who lack enough fire support. Most battalions only have FPVs, grenades & rockets as support weapons. Secondly, the weapons boost the danger posed by organised crime. To note the issue of military weapons ending up in criminal hands occurs in western countries as well. 

Due to poor communication between police & military units at the start of full scale war there was an OPSEC leak. Ukrainian units hid weapons for stay behind forces. In one instance Ukrainian police ‘found’ them & dug them up showcasing it as a successful operation. This altered Russian forces to the practice.    

In the summer of 2024 Russia initiated a new tactic to sabotage the Ukrainian war effort. Russia is recruiting a fifth column to commit arson via social media. They are paid to burn vehicles belonging to Ukrainian military units, NGOs & volunteers. These vehicles are civilian model SUVs & pick ups. They are used for rear duties, evacuations & to deliver supplies. Alongside the loss of the vehicles the items within the vehicles, such as drones, laptops, medkits etc, are also destroyed. Ukrainian Police & military police have launched numerous manhunts & night time patrols have increased.

Arson 

As previously mentioned, war has increased poverty & harmed the economy. The saboteurs are generally ordinary people who do not have an ideological motive but instead need money. Typically they are only paid a couple hundred dollars per job. All they had to do is send a video of them completing the job. Teenagers (as young as 12/13) are commonly used since they do not fully comprehend what they are doing. Ukrainian criminals are now organising the arsonists into rings. Arson carries up to 10 years in prison however since this is sabotage during martial law it is up to life imprisonment. Alongside judicial punishment Ukraine is trying to raise awareness with parents & counter online recruitment. This is one of the many creative asymmetrical tactics Moscow is employing. This shows the importance of maintaining social security during war to negate desperation. Ukrainian social security is dependent on foreign loans & grants which are not enough albeit very generous. It is common for adversities to exploit those in debt due to their vulnerability. Aldrich Ames & Robert Hanseen, both CIA double agents, were in debt when they started to work for Soviet & Russian intelligence services. 

 Defensive positions struggles

Throughout the war Ukrainian units have suffered unnecessary losses due to their positions. These problems range from corruption to rigid Soviet mindsets. 

Corruption 

As with all aspects of the military there are opportunities for corruption. Building fortifications come under the jurisdiction of the military & also the local government. Embezzlement & fraud can be rife. Both Ukraine & Russia suffer from this problem. 

During the 2024 Kharkiv Offensive  it became apparent that a number of Ukrainian defensive positions were inadequate. Either in the wrong area, not meeting strength requirements or non-existent. Images showed piles of dragon teeth kms from the front line. These are meant to form physical barriers to stop vehicles. They were in that pile for over two years. 

The lack of adequate fortifications was a contributing factor in early Russian successes in this new AO. A number of border settlements were captured. Eventually with Ukrainian reinforcements & the US allowing for counter battery missions in Belgorod, with American weapons, the front was stabilised in June. This defence, like any military operation, came at a cost. Casualties would have been much less with properly fortified positions & multiple layers of defence to fall back on. Plugging a gap with unprepared reserves is not a sufficient tactic however it happens across the battlefield. Often when a line is buckling or when forces need to withdraw under cover the 47th Brigade is brought in. The 47th Brigade on paper is one of the strongest in the Ukrainian Ground Forces. It was trained & equipped with western weaponry in preparation for the 2023 counter offensive. It has highly effective M2A2 ODS SA Bradleys & M1A1 Abrams (Leopard 2A6s during the counter offensive). Overall the offensive was a strategic failure. The brigade took heavy vehicle losses in the southern AO especially around Mala Tokmachka, Zaporizhzhia. It is now used as a sort of strategic reserve force. The 47th brigade currently cannot effectively plug gaps in defensive lines due to a lack of infantry. 

Building positions

Building defences whilst an attack is underway is very challenging; they must be prepared beforehand. Fortifications should be a proactive measure not a reactive one. 

Specifically regarding the 2024 Kharkiv offensive Ukraine had 2 years to build these barriers between the 2022 Battle of Kharkiv & this new offensive. A number of fortifications have been built by engineering troops around the country but often in questionable areas. Such as building coastal defences in Odesa. The risk of an amphibious landing in Odesa is extremely low, especially since the Russian Navy still continues to take losses if they venture out to sea. Defences should have been built on the border with Russia (Sumy & Kharkiv) & behind the front line in the East. 

Ukrainian troops when they withdraw from positions complain they lack a line of defences behind them. This was especially apparent after the tough battles in Bakhmut, Soledar, Avdiivka. Ukrainians forces heroically held these positions beyond the point of utility. There was more than enough time to prepare rear positions. 

When a major battle is won by Russia they are able to exploit the localised advances & push forward with momentum. Momentum is a dangerous force. It needs to be blunted quickly. Clearing bunkers, anti-tank trenches, barbed wire, land mines etc is an effective way to stall the enemy. There should be lines of defences which get stronger, allowing Ukraine to safely withdraw when battles get too intense. Multiple Ukrainian officers voice concern over the lack of fall back defences. 

Adequately planning contingencies saves lives. Ukrainian security agencies & anti-corruption officials started to investigate military units & local politicians. This defensive failure spurred on the creation of the ‘Temporary Special Commission of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the use of the state budget of Ukraine aimed at the construction of fortifications and engineering barriers on the contact line’. Basically a parliamentary committee looking at money spent on fortification. This was voted by the Rada (Parliament) on the 22nd May 2024. 12 days after the Kharkiv offensive was renewed. Opposition parties, such as European Solidarity, had been pushing for this long in advance. Ukraine anti-corruption activities have come a long way but a lot of work is still needed. Why the delay in this commission being created? Corruption & the Soviet mindset of certain military officers have dealt untold damage to the ZSU. 

Part 2

Ukrainian high command struggles

Tactics & equipment are forever evolving however basic fundamental principles stay. Ancient texts such as The Art of War by Sun Tzu are just as influential now then when they were published. It is imperative to learn from the past so we do not repeat historical mistakes. Failure to respect what has happened to get to the present day can undo military success. 

Insufficient equipment 

Improper usage of vehicles 

Away from home; the need to target Russian spheres of influences across the world

Myanmar 

Sudan 

Sahel Region 

Syria

Destruction of dams 

Impacts of energy attacks 

Stalled projects & underdevelopment of weapons 

Why few Russian POWs?