Defending the Rebel Fortress Part II: Truth behind the curtain. PLA & ROC Armed Forces problems.

(Liability: Lion Research Co does not claim liability, this is not defence, medical nor investment advice,

Disapproval of the CCP/Xi etc is not reason for racism or discrimination, Lion Research Co condemns anti-Asian/Chinese sentiments)

Defending the Rebel Fortress Part II: Truth behind the ROC's capabilities and issues PLA will face

Always troubles in armed forces:

Simple truth is the Taiwanese Armed Forces are full of holes. There is no room for cope. There are many critical issues which need to be patched. Currently the PLA is more prepared than Taiwan. Taiwan *can* defends itself but not currently. There needs to be a realisation amongst the Taiwanese public, especially the younger generation, that major changes and reforms are needed. Taiwan is upgrading but the pace is too slow. A strong self-dependent Taiwanese Armed Forces is the number 1 way to maintain the status quo. Lion Research Co advocates to maintain the status quo.

Society:

Before the report devolves into issues regarding both sides it must be noted about the societies of both countries. The Republic of China and People’s Republic of China culturally, as expected, have numerous similarities. Both are generally conservative and patriarchal with the family at the centre. There is a strict hierarchy based on age and stability is well liked. Reform breaks stability and even worse the desire for reform generally comes from low ranking individuals. This needs to be broken.

Reform, reform, reform. There must be change. However, senior officers do not like to admit they are wrong. This is an issue plaguing the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This is the deep rooted Soviet mindset which reduces combat efficiency due to an overbearing command structure which does not allow for low level adaptability. This costs the lives of many soldiers, the true figure will never be known. Ukraine was on the path of westernisation in doctrine after 2014 however once full scale war started there has been a surge in troop numbers. Paired with officer casualties this has arguably resulted in a backwards shift. This will be discussed further in a future report. Change normally occurs only after a disaster. After the humiliating debacle of the Vietnam war the US Armed Forces embarked on a major transition. The climax of this was the resounding victory during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 Iraq.

Taiwan needs to transform now. It is not possible during any invasion and the troops killed due to no change cannot be brought back to life. Time is not on the side of the defenders so it will need to be enacted quickly. Some estimates put a possible invasion as 2027. This is plausible but it may be earlier. Xi and the PLA command know if Taiwan changes they will only get stronger with time so may order a more rushed timeline. The PLA do however have issues of their own. If they are successful Beijing will not mind high casualty figures.

Back when Taiwan lived under martial law the Armed Forces were effectively under the complete control of the Kuomintang political party. Still to this day the civilian-military relationship is complicated. There is a lack of openness and the close knit nature of leadership adds to the lack of reforms. In the US the Secretary of Defence cannot have been a serving officer within the last 7 years. This is to maintain civilian control. In ROC this does not exist. Defence ministers and deputy defence ministers are chosen exclusively by the President. They are nearly all recently retired generals. This reinforces the current mindset. In the US the Secretary of Defence requires Congressional approval whilst in the UK the Secretary of State for Defence is appointed by the Monarch (chosen by the Prime Minister). Taiwan is more like the UK, the legislature does not get to confirm ministerial appointments.

Morale:

Morale is the fundamental force which holds an army together. It is paramount to unit cohesion. A stronger morale will mean more determined defenders and those who are less likely to surrender. Morale is an issue with Taiwanese troops. There is a lack of strategy with aims and objectives. Lacking a goal is a colossal military mistake. Russian troops in Ukraine lack any clear objectives which is a contributor to poor morale. The goal for the Taiwanese armed forces should be to defend their country and their way of living. There is an issue with a defeatism mindset. This needs to be wiped. Many believed Ukraine wouldn’t be able to hold off the Russian onslaught however they did. Taiwan, if changes are made, can defeat an invasion. There needs to be a strong can-do attitude. For the PLA morale is not great either, mainly the pay and the fact it is part conscript (like Taiwan). It was at one point, fully volunteer, the PLA like most NATO armies. When PLA soldiers are killed in skirmishes with the Indian Army, Beijing refuses to comment which adds to the poor morale. Back to ROC. Taiwanese troops do fear speaking out and when they do real interviews it is via a fake name. Amongst low ranking soldiers some view themselves as cannon-fodder. As with any invasion, nationalism and patriotism will increase but it will be difficult to shake such a deep rooted sense of defeatism. Beijing will likely attempt to capitalise on this.

Identity problems are not helping morale. A growing number of the general public identify as ‘Taiwanese’ and want independence. However, China is trying to influence senior commanders. There are sustained information campaigns to change their views and beliefs. Amongst senior officers, fewer of them say they are ‘Taiwanese’ according to numerous polls. This is one reason for the number of corruption cases which are explained in more detail later.

Another element which leads to poor morale is the pay. Taiwan is a high income economy according to the World Bank. This means salaries are high with the average monthly salary being slightly over 1,800 USD . Whilst army pay is notoriously low. For a professional full time private the starting salary 1,235 USD this is a significant drop of 31%. Then for a conscript it is even worse. According to Global Taiwan Institute, the current conscript salary will increase to 877 USD per month however it used to be an appealing 207 USD per month. There is a pension, which is currently being reformed, and other benefits such as bonuses, insurance and subsidised lodging.

However, with below average salaries the brightest recruits will look for other work at home or abroad. Pay for a junior ranked officer is not good either and officers complain it is not worth the extra responsibilities and workload.

Other problems which are present in the Taiwanese armed forces help cause declining morale. High unprofessionalism due to poor training, reliability issues with equipment, ineffective command, poor living conditions. These are explained in greater detail later. Troops go with the flow and those with dissenting opinions are repressed. The flow needs to change. Every year hundreds of contract soldiers leave early by resigning. This is allowed if they pay a fee. None of this adds to morale. There is generally a lack of officers in Taiwan. This is an issue since in a war there will be high casualty rates for junior officers. So older/retired officers will fulfil these roles. They will generally have an outdated mindset and this will be a burden on combat capabilities.

Training:

Conscription is the source for most training issues in Taiwan.

The rifle is the backbone of all infantry activities, it’s paramount that infantry know how to use it confidently. All troops regardless of role must be comfortable using a rifle. Confidence in your equipment is key to success and morale. The T91 is the standard issue 5.56 NATO rifle. It is a solid model with moderately successful export. However, there is an issue with rifles in training. Companies in training report there not being enough to go around and some rifles are broken. The best equipment is only given to frontline units and conscripts or echelon troops get rifles with reliability issues. This is appealing. It is dreadful. Equipment is there to be used, not locked away. Russia, when they initially invaded units did not use certain electronical command and communication systems as they were not trained on them. It is fundamental that troops have access to suitable equipment and be trained appropriately. Some recruits report only firing 6 rounds. Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) fire 800-900 rounds during 65 hours of arms handling training. Troops question if their comrades can operate a rifle. This poor training will add to the canner-fodder and defeatism mindset. To fix morale issues you need to combat the root cause. Taiwan is developing and adapting to improve. Rifle training has changed but it is still not enough. Knowing how to unblock a jam and fire kneeing & prone is one thing. Doing a complete rifle strip and firing at night as part of a battalion on a realistic exercise is a different thing. Moreover, for the conscripts who are now reservists and graduated under the old system. They will need intense refresher courses to increase their ability to an even level. Having units with widely different abilities is highly unwise. Current refresher courses are described as inadequate.

Currently it is 4 months of conscription. However, in 2024 it will increase to 1 year. 4 months is described as not enough for a soldier but it is doable. Finnish conscription is 165 days (standard), 255 days (specialist), 347 days (NCO). You can make the 4 months short but intense. More exciting is key. Current training is described as dull and like a summer camp. Again poor morale and defeatist mindset. Ukrainian infantry recruits in the UK (Op Interflex) get 5 weeks and they go from civilians to soon to be deployed troops. Conscription varies between countries. Singapore is 2 years whilst in Lithuania it is 9 months. Reducing conscription length means it will be cheaper, need less instructors and effort can be focused to refresher courses. The budget saved can be put towards wages and modern equipment. 6-8 months is a happy medium. What is key to reducing the length is to remove unnecessary sections. Drill, PT and discipline are all important but scrap the goose-step parades. There is also an excessive amount of cleaning being done by conscripts beyond typical military levels. They are there to train, not do unreasonable amounts of chores around the barracks. Russian conscripts before the full scale invasion would be routinely used by commanding officers (CO) as labour to perform civilian construction work. Revenues would then be pocketed by the CO. Another area for waste is bayonet training. Yes and no. Will you use it no, but it instils strength and determination. The British Army still retains it. Small unit tactics are a must. You’re training infantry reserve, not cannon fodder. Get them cohesive and get them moving, correct positioning, fire + shoot section teamwork. Learning basic information, don't shoot in the same urban position twice (unless absolutely necessary). Enemy will know and return fire. Build up from the fire team, section, platoon, company, then mix in vehicles. End the training with a large scale OPFOR exercise week. Something troops will look forward to. What is key is conscript training alongside regular units. In a war, they will fight alongside so train alongside.

There is also a distinctive lack of simulators currently. Many weapons have simulators which makes training cheaper, more efficient and safer. Simulators range from NLAWs to Abram turrets. Taiwan needs to invest in this field. Taiwan in the middle of 2023 announced they have made 200+ combat simulators of varying kinds. It is a good step. But, all troops need access to these, not just a select few. However, an over dependance on simulators is an issue. Soldiers want to be outside and get stuff done. So simulators should be the initial step and for refreshing.

Getting experience from countries with active conscription such as Finland, Latvia, etc will be key. Understanding how they do it successfully and how they combat issues. There is a fear of speaking out negatively in the Taiwanese Armed Forces so get troops at the end of the course to submit confidential feedback. Read that feedback and learn. Learning is paramount. All ranges must be safe and secure. Ukraine does have an issue with range safety at times. Foreign support can help massively in this field. The British Army has the specialist 11 Security Force Assistance Brigade for training and advising foreign armies. British deployment of advisors and instructors to Sierra Leone (2000-2002) was vital in the government win in the civil war.

Why? Questionable Taiwanese equipment and solutions

For the most part PLA procurements have been sensible and realistic. They contribute to growing modernisation of the armed forces and follow a clear strategy. Some equipment models do however have teething issues but they will be ironed out before any invasion.

Taiwan needs to think differently. A hybrid strategy will suit Taiwan, able to leverage the pros and negate the negatives of both.

Taiwan with its past procurements is buying extremely conventionally and is acting like a normal armed forces. This is not the mindset which is needed. A conventional Taiwan versus a conventional China there is only one winner in the end. Thinking outside of the box is critical.

Firstly let’s start with the Air Force

Buying E-2 Hawkeye AWACS and P-3 Orion Maritime patrol aircraft. AWACS stands for Airborne Early Warning And Control. The E-2 has a large rotating radar dome on its roof. It is a very effective system that is not the issue. It can locate and process 100s of separate targets. Additionally, it can direct and vector aircraft onto targets. But it is highly vulnerable. The E-2 is a slow, not very manoeuvrable twin piston engine aircraft. It will be a sitting duck for very long range AAMs such as the PL-21. Anywhere they fly they will be within PL-21 range. Chinese aviators flying J-20 Leopard aircraft can just approach Taiwan from any angle. Flying low down to avoid radar will be useless since it’s a radar aircraft. Lower height means smaller radar range. However, before full scale combat E-2 Hawkeyes can perform the important task of tracking the build up of Chinese forces. But once war starts they are worth scrap metal. The E-2 however can use arresting wires to land.

The usage of AWACS during a conflict is better suited to foreign powers. Even if other countries such as the US do not directly intervene. They may perform their own AWACS missions from international waters. For example the Royal Air Force (RAF) routinely flies RC-135 Joint River AWACS over the Black Sea. Similar flights are flown on the Polish-Belarusian border. The same may be down for Taiwan. Since these aircraft are in friendly/international air space they cannot be showdown. If the US does not intervene. China will 100% not target American/Allied AWACS flights in international air space since targeting these aircraft will force the Americans to act. Similar to the destruction of the Maine at the start of the 1899 Spanish American War or on a more drastic note 1941 Pearl Harbour. These events forced a reluctant America to join with full force. We all know how they ended for Spain and Japan. China will not want the same. These flights can give a tactical advantage to Taiwan.

The other questionable Taiwanese Air Force aeroplane is the P-3 Orion. This is even more questionable. Why did Taiwan buy 12. It’s like the Taiwan procurement committee looked at a list of possible equipment and made sure they ticked off each type. The P-3 Orion is a maritime patrol aircraft which can hunt for submarine (sonar buoys) and surface vessels. Taiwan will be in no position to do ASW. The Orion is a large 4 engine piston aircraft. It will be a very easy target for aircraft especially with the PL-21 and for air defence ships such as the Type 055 destroyer. You may say it can fire Harpoon anti-ship missiles but it would make a lot more sense if they were launched from manoeuvrable fighters (F-16s, IDF, etc) or harpoon coastal defence batteries. During war the P-3C will serve no purpose. For a 4 engine aircraft the P- however has a relatively short landing capability. Taiwan is in talks to buy 12 more maritime patrol aircraft which is again questionable. Money would be more suited for coastal defence radars and C-UAV systems.

Should Taiwan have no piston powered aircraft? No. There is a place in combat for pistone power air mobility and strike missions. The US SOCOM (Special Operations Command) uses the L3 Harris Sky Warden for strike/recon missions. It is well liked by SOF for its versatility and ease of use. Other small pistone models used by militaries around the world include the Skyvan and Cessna 208 Caravan. These would be able to transfer critical equipment and troops. Taiwanese pilots would have to be trained for extremely low level flight to reduce risk of anti-air missiles. Ukrainian pilots are very well known for their ability to fly at nap of the earth level, barely a 1m above the ground. These aircraft would land on dirt and impoverished runways. Such missions would still be fairly dangerous and friendly fire would be a risk. During Iraqi operations, coalition pilots were more afraid of friendly Patriot batteries than Iraqi air defences.

The US has also refused a request for F-35s. This is good. Sounds unproductive. Why is it good that Taiwan is not getting the most modern US export stealth fighter? The F-35 is not the type of aircraft Taiwan needs. It is an expensive high maintenance aircraft which requires an 8,000 foot runway unless it is the F-35B VTOL variant. Issue with VTOL is they use large amounts of fuel which is not ideal for an island nation which cannot be resupplied. Secondly, due to weight constraints the payload is less. What Taiwan needs is a plane like the Swedish Gripen. Low maintenance, easy to use and short take/landing. It only needs an 800x16m runway. So it can use a partly damaged runway, taxiway or even a motorway. Taiwan needs to develop using the motorway. During the Cold War sections of the Autobahn would be specially designed to be able to turn into ad hoc airfields. Taiwan is developing their new ‘Advanced Defence Fighter (ADF)‘.

To end the criticism of the Air Force we have air defence. Taiwan has a 1.4 billion dollar American PAVE radar. It’s an extremely good radar on top of a mountain. It can reportedly give a 6 minute warning on Chinese ballistic missiles. However, it’s a massive stationary target on top of a mountain. China will just send missiles after missile, long range kamikaze drone after drone until it is hit. And radars are fragile; you do not need much shrapnel to put it out of action. If you fire 500 kamikaze drones all you need is 1 good hit for it to be knocked out. Even if Taiwan can intercept 100% of incoming missiles they will suffer from missile depletion and have to defend other sites so it will be destroyed. The idea of a massive radar on top of a mountain works if it’s on continental America since it’s far away from risks. However, the Taiwanese PAVE is too close to the enemy. It cannot be moved or hidden. This is a totally ridiculous waste of 1.4 billion dollars. It would have been a lot better if you brought a number of portable radars of various ranges. You can camouflage them, move them, create decoys etc. None of this is possible with the PAVE.Yes, they were brought during total different times however, during 2023 the UK MoD ordered 11 lightweight Giraffe 1X 3D radars from Swedish company Saab. These multipurpose radars can detect drones, helicopters, aircraft and even perform counter-battery missions. All for £25.6 million. Taiwan also has some Tien Kung II (Sky Bow) missiles in silos. Again, this does not make sense. They are in fixed known positions. Silos work if you are far from the enemy. These silos have the same set of flaws as the PAVE. Extra wheeled Sky Bow II would have made more sense.

Taiwan operates three calibres of towed guns (20mm, 35mm and 40mm) which is fine. However, none of these have automatic radar guidance and firing. It is also common in Ukrainian, Russian, Syrian and Moldvian service to mount these towed guns on basic trucks. Unlike more sophisticated systems such as Gepard or Skynex As a result, you will not be able to hit anything flying fast or with high manoeuvrability. Loitering munitions and kamikaze drones will be the primary/only target for these. The Russian lancet is a potent and effective weapon. Ukraine also uses Bofors 40mm L/70 (same as Taiwan) to counter Shahed-131/136 drones. None of the Taiwanese SHORAD systems (Antelope, Avenger, TC-2, MIM-72) are combined radar guided missile & cannons. They are all missile based. Missile based SHORAD can be overwhelmed/perform poorly against drones. The effective British Stormer HVM has been damaged twice by Lancets in Ukraine. Ukraine keeps C-UAV EW and ground based cannons near air defence to provide air cover. Soviet/Russian SHORAD 2S6 (2K22) and Pantsir systems have a combination of cannons and missiles.

Army/Marine Corps:

The Taiwanese Army maintains a sizable amphibious assault capability. This is highly questionable. Taiwan will not be in a position to perform a large-scale amphibious invasion. At best, Taiwan will be able to perform small boat raiding parties to nearby islands similar to what Ukraine SOF does now over the Dnipro river. It is likely there is a political and maintaining tradition to why the sizable marine element still exists.

Marines will fight as mechanised infantry. Ukrainian Marines on operations, bar equipment models, are indistinguishable from mountain, air assault or regular mechanised forces. The main amphibious vehicle of the Taiwan Armed Force is the AA7V which is not suitable for intense combat. The firepower is good; it's a M2 Browning 50 cal HMG and a Mk19 40mm grenade launcher. This gives a strong anti-personnel and light anti vehicle capability. Same as the M1117. However, the passive defence of the vehicle is weak. It has quite thin armour (small arms and shell shrapnel only) and a poor reputation for mine resistance. During the 2003 battle of Al Faw numerous USMC AA7V were destroyed. Unfortunately some with entire crews and troops lost.

Taiwan also maintains LVT-5s in some Marine Corps units and as mortar batteries. This is even worse than the AA7V in terms of armour. The AA7V was withdrawn from use in Afghanistan and Iraq. If Taiwan wants to maintain a sizable amphibious force. There are better amphibious vehicles. European marines are generally equipped with the BVs-10 (known in Royal Marine service as Viking) or the older BVs-206S. These have an equal or greater (depends on package) ballistic protection, a much better mine protection. Moreover, they are smaller in size. These vehicles can also be used in rough terrain such as in eastern Taiwan. The AA7V and LVT-5s are much taller and wider. The centre of mass is higher up in the vehicle making it harder to operate off-road.

The Taiwan Army artillery corp has too many models. M1 240mm howitzers on top of Kinmen and Matsu forts are useless. They are immobile slow firing, not very accurate guns. Purely, a morale boost. In war they have no use. Taiwan is in the process of acquiring 108 M1A2T Abrams. This is extremely good. Alongside this procurement there are plans to upgrade the M60A3TTS fleet which numbers 460. Again logical and makes sense. NATO member Turkey is currently upgrading its M60A3 fleet. However, Taiwan is looking to upgrade its CM-11 tank fleet which numbers 450. Remove CM-11. It is unnecessary for 3 tank models in the Army fleet. It will save money, training and most importantly logistics. Logistics is spoken about more later. Not all is bad. Taiwan is procuring the excellent HIMARS (high mobility artillery rocket system). Ukraine has been experts at using this for deep strikes, destroying HVTs and counter-battery missions. The HIMARS will bring a much needed boost to artillery forces. 29 units is more than Ukraine has currently (16 units).

Navy:

The ROC Navy is a particular area for concern. There are a number of antiquated vessels. There is a critical lack of modern major surface fleet ships. The main surface elements of the ROC navy are 4 x Kee Lung class destroyers (Kidd class), 6 x Chi Yang class frigates (Knox class), 10 x Cheng Kung class frigates (Oliver Hazard Perry class), 6 x Kang ding (La Fayette class) class frigates. These are old and antiquated. Taiwan knows this. They lack vertical launch systems. Kee Lung has 2 x Mk26 arm launchers, Cheng Kung has 1 x Mk13 launcher, Kang Ding has no long range air defence only close in naval MIM-72 (AIM-9 launcher). Upgraded Chi Yang class is better than the others, its air defence missile in box launchers. VLS, the missiles are stored in canisters, and fired vertically either using their motor or compressed air. The Mk26 & Mk13 in comparison to VLS (US standard is Mk41) is slower, with more moving parts, more maintenance and less reliability. Greece refused the Kidd class when offered on sale in the late 90s/early 200s. Ukraine in 2018 was offered Oliver Hazard Perry class however the officer was not taken up. Ukrainian admirals would have known their faults against multiple missile attacks. Turkish shipyards are currently building Ada class VLS corvettes for Ukraine and there are the domestic VLS Volodymyr class frigates.

The VLS can fire as many missiles as the fire control system can handle simultaneously. The Mk13 & Mk26 are slower to reload. They will not be able to deal with saturation/swarm attacks. The PLA will go all out on day one. As many AShM as possible will be fired. For any possibility of survival VLS is mandatory. Reloading VLS is a tricky problem as it requires a stable platform as the VLS canisters are reloaded via a crane from the top of the deck. Doing it at sea has been tested by the USN but it is of a delicate operation. A port will be required. Designing an easier way to reload VLS will be important. Retired Mk13 & Mk26 launchers should be repurposed for land based defence. Modern VLS missiles such as the British Seaceptor can be quad packed into 1 canister for increased missile load. Taiwanese frigates and destroyers need as many air defence missiles as possible to stay alive. Due to the vast size difference between Taiwan and China. Even if the PLA fires 40+ AShM missiles for 1 target, it will be a success. Taiwan knows this and is procuring a number of VLS vessels and some equipped even with the Aegis combat system. This is smart and vital. The 6 x Kang Ding class is being upgraded with a 32 x TC-2 cell VLS.

Some future procurements are still highly dubious. There are plans for a helicopter assault ship. Why? The purpose of the ROC navy is the first line of defence, not projecting power away from home. It is a large target and will have to be escorted at all times as part of a task force. The armament of the future vessel is unknown but it will have CIWS and perhaps a small salvo of SAMs. The RN’s 2 X Queen Elizabeth class carriers only have CIWS. During war, it will not have a purpose. After the sinking of the cruiser ARA General Belgrano by HMS Conqueror during the Falklands war, the carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo played no role as it was withdrawn due to safety. Carriers are very risky to use in conventional warfare. Especially, since Taiwan will not be the stronger out of the two. British Carriers had to be always surrounded and it was somewhat fortunate none were sunk. Taiwan has no VTOL (vertical take off and landing) aircraft and using it solely for helicopters makes no sense. It is a waste of money.

Another odd procurement is the Yushan-class landing platform dock. Visually, it looks similar to the US San Antonio class ships. The Yushan-class is designed to carry marines, their vehicles and a collection of helicopters. It has a Italian 76mm naval gun, two Phalanx CIWS, and two 20mm auto-cannons. Taiwan is upgrading their 76mm guns with DART precision ammunition. The 76mm is on a number of other ships. Which is a sensible logical move. This radio guided munition will become a part of the ships close range air defence and vital for C-UAV. Hai Chien SAMs can also be mounted. The Yushan’s intended landing purpose will not happen. If Taiwan wants to retake Penghu or other islands it will be via strangling sea & air logistics then small special forces platoons on fast patrol craft. The Yushan class can carry a number of anti-ship missiles which will be their main role in any defence of Taiwan. However, it makes more sense to equip fast missile boats with such weapons than a bulky landing platform dock. Yushan will have a larger radar signature so it can be seen further away and it will not be able to perform rapid evasive manoeuvres like a smaller craft can.

The battle of Latakia during the Yom Kippur War shows combat between anti-ship guided missile equipped boats. The first in history. Taiwan needs to learn from this.

Decisive Israeli victory. During the first encounter it was 4 Israeli Sa’ar 3 and 1 Sa’ar 4 missile boats versus a number of Soviet made Osa and Komar class missile boats. The Soviet made P-15 AShM which had a vastly greater range than the Israeli Grabiel AShM. However, no Israelis ships were lost nor hit whilst a number of Syrian naval vessels were sunk. Why? The Israeli crews had better training they could react and manoeuvre upon radar highlighting they were under attack. Simple zig zags may be the difference. Quickly the ships deployed radar decoys (chaff) and the Israelis had developed sophisticated ECM (Electronic Countermeasures). This made the missile seekers confused and unable to hit the targets. The Soviet designed and made ships lacked such defences. Their only defence was speed and trying to hug the coast to be in range of coastal defences. Syrian coastal defence artillery batteries did open fire and were relatively accurate but scored no hits. However, Taiwanese coastal defence batteries will be AShM but they will be overwhelmed by the number of targets. The quality of Chinese anti-ship missiles do vary from novel ballistic anti-ship missiles to P-15 derivatives.

Taiwan should learn from this battle. Their ships need to be fast and agile and have layers of counter measures so they can defend themselves even if no air defence missiles are available. Moreover, even though the tactic of hugging the coast should be deployed by Taiwan, it has been shown to not be foolproof.

The submarine service of Taiwan is highly dated. Two are upgraded WW2 era submarines. Questionable if they are function. The other two are Hai Lung class. These are of a Dutch design from the 1980s. They will be loud, unable to stay submerged for long and lack long range torpedoes. The PLA will have heavy ASW from aircraft, helicopters and their navy. Taiwan understands this appealing state and is procuring 8 domestic modern submarines called ‘Indigenous Defence Submarine (IDS)’. USN parts will be used in them.

Logistics win wars

Without logistical support an army is nothing. As Napoleon said ‘an army marches on its stomach’. Logistical troops need to supply food, water, ammo, medical equipment, spare parts & other supplies. Without them there is no fighting capabilities. The largest Corps in the British Army is the Logistical Corps. Only circa 25% of the British Army is infantry. Some conscripts also need to be trained in logistics. Conscripts' roles should be based on their usual day job. If they are a truck driver then logistical driver, if they are a construction manager then field fortifications etc. Ukraine does this.

Taiwanese logistics are shockingly poor in some aspects.

Starting with the basics. Taiwan has the unarmoured CM-24 (200 in service) & armoured M992 ammunition ammunition resupply vehicles for troops. The tracked CM-24 is based on the CM-21 vehicle. Having some logistical vehicles tracked is vital. Yes, tracked vehicles require more maintenance, are more expensive & are slower they have redeeming features. They are able to traverse much rougher terrain and can cross small gaps at speed. To cross gaps such as narrow trenches, wheeled vehicles have to slow down. Taiwanese weather can be muddy with monsoon or snowy in the winter. Tracks are vastly superior in these conditions. The Soviet Mt-Lb may have its flaws however it is a supreme off-road vehicle. The British Army lacks a dedicated tracked logistical vehicle. Of course ad hoc you can always throw supplies in a troop compartment. During the Cold War the British Army had the amphibious cross country Stalwart wheeled vehicle. Taiwan lacks organically amphibious logistical vehicles. With many rivers and with bridges being prime targets, this is a vulnerability. It is not always possible to rely on pontoon bridges and ferries. Ukraine is currently procuring a number of domestic amphibious Sherp ATVs.

Having vehicles based on others is good as it helps with reducing spare parts & maintenance. It is not however modular. Ideally, vehicles should be modular. The Boxer is a prime example of this. In the field within 15 mins the combat modules can be changed. The chassis are all the same. Therefore, you can swap from command, IFV to ambulance & many more very quickly. As battlefield conditions change this gives officers the ability to adapt their forces accordingly.

The M992 fills a very important role. It is based on a M109 SPG (also in ROC service). It is armoured and provides 155mm shell resupply for artillery. This means the crews don’t have to travel to field resupply depots but instead the M992 comes to them. Moreover, it means unarmoured vehicles that carry shells , which are very vulnerable, don’t have to travel as close to the frontlines as they can meet the M992 half way. However, the Taiwan Marine Corps only has 6 M992 and a lot more are needed. 100+ at least. Ukraine only operates a small number of M992s as well. There is protection from shrapnel and some FPV & kamikaze drone hits. It can carry 95 shells. Keeping shells moving in these will reduce the dependency on field depots. When shells are on the move they are much harder to target. Russia in the summer of 2022, when HIMARS arrived, had too many shells concentrated in a number of large field depots so when they were struck it caused an initial logistical shock. Ideally, shells stay stationary for as little amount of time as possible. The US has an electronic logistical system which is highly timed. In comparison the Russian armed forces cannot time logistics well and the choice is either leave the supplies in trucks or dump it. The supplies are dumped in the open and all it takes is a drone grenade to detonate them all. If Taiwan has to operate field depots, which is likely, they should be well camouflaged and small in size. So if they are hit, they are only a local tactical level defeat with as few units as possible impacted.

Regarding general utility trucks there is only 1 main model, the Navatar 7400. Having 1 main vehicle helps maintain constant logistics. There are other civilian models of utility vans in usage. It is a standard truck with a variable payload depending on the variant from 6.9 tons to 24 tons (metric). This is acceptable however the lower end of 6.9 tons is quite low. The British Army standard HX truck has a payload of 17 tons. The 6.9 tons is comparable to the Russian Army standard issue Ural-4320. Moreover, these Navistars do not follow ISO 20 foot containerization guidelines. Modern trucks such as the HX do have this ability. These allowed for greater adaptability. This has many benefits. Recent command modules and radars (such as the German TRML-40) are designed to be placed on 20 foot container specified trucks. Moreover, weapon systems such as OWA-UAV or missile launchers can be based on 20 foot metal containers. The Russian Klub-K missile is developed for usage on ISO containers. As a result, any truck which follows ISO 20 foot, so carry them instead of a specialist vehicle. However, Taiwanese specialist vehicles do not use the Navatar 7400. HIMARS uses FMTV, Thunderbolt-2000 uses MAN HX81, Patriot uses Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck etc. This is an issue. These vehicles are small in number compared to Navatar 7400 but are defence critical. Their reliability is absolute maximum priority. This needs to be streamlined.

Lion Research Co has not seen any armoured Navatar 7400 variant in Taiwanese service which is a problem. Armoured trucks in Ukrainian service have saved the lives of many supply crews. This is especially important when near the zero line. Armoured trucks offer protection from ambushes, snipers and FPV drones. As little as a grenade to the engine can take a truck out of action. ZSU drone pilots have a particularly high record against the unarmoured UAZ-452 utility van. The GMLRS M30A1, which fires 182,000 tungsten rounds, is especially dangerous against unarmoured trucks. Both Ukraine and Russia perform field upgrades of trucks by slapping whatever spare metal is available. These work to varying levels. It is reminiscent of Vietnam war gun trucks. In Ukraine, due to the threat of drones, grenades and FPV there are many variants of ‘cope cages’. Heavily memed but they do serve a purpose. Against an ATGM, artillery etc useless. However, they can protect against grenades & FPV at times by causing premature detonation. It acts as slat & spaced armour. China is innovating massively in FPV & drone grenades so Taiwan should develop a workable solution. Nearly all FPV drones used by Ukraine and Russia are off Chinese origin. However, armoured trucks are not indestructible to the major threat to all ground vehicles. ATGMs. Speed is a tried and tested technique to counter such a threat. Expensive defensive solutions can be mounted on trucks however the Taiwanese defence budget is only 19 billion USD. Therefore mounting hard kill APS, weapon fire locators & C-UAV EW on trucks will be unsustainable bar a few select vehicles.

Zero line logistics is extremely difficult due to heavy fire, drones, and bombed terrain trucks cannot be used right on the frontlines. As a result, for final mile logistics it is usually fulfilled by infantry on foot, quad bikes and buggies. The ROC army lacks quad bikes and buggies are only used in strike roles (SC-09A). This needs to change. The British Army is exploring new small tracked vehicles & quad bikes for logistics. Drones are always being used increasingly in a logistical role. Dropping rations and medical kits as needed. Defenders in Soledar used this tactic as roads became untenable at the final stages of the battle. Unmanned Ground Drones such as the Estonian THeMIS are used to carry supplies and stretchers. This is faster and requires less troops than if infantry carried. Again Taiwan has not developed this element of drone warfare. The British Army uses the Malloy series of drones for heavy cargo. The idea of using aerial drones as CASEVAC is however totally unwise. The British Army has tested this out. Firstly they cannot be properly monitored or treated by medics so only stable patients can use it. Secondly, it will be vulnerable to air defence and EW.

The Taiwanese Logistical Corps contains many other problems. Most glaring is the reliability. During Operation Desert Storm the US Army maintained Abrams, Bradleys and M113s all above 90% combat reliability. In Taiwan, during peacetime even, tracked vehicles have 50% or below reliability. This is absolutely shocking. Some vehicles have poor engines, some vehicles have nonfunctional main guns. These are not combat ready. At an absolute minimum the propulsion, weapon & communication systems must all be functional. The issue of this is exacerbated by fraudulent reports. Officers to appease command are saying vehicles are functional when they are not. There is a lack of accountability. If the PLA attacks tomorrow, the armed forces cannot defend efficiently. There must be a full audit. An amnesty should be declared to allow for officers to say the truth. These logistical officers are under immense stress. They know there will be punishment if the truth is out. There are always two sides. The main reason for the low reliability is a lack of spare parts. Ukraine has become highly astute at stripping apart destroyed Russian vehicles for as many spare parts as possible. Down to the last bolt. There are no shared vehicle types between Taiwan and China. However, both sides do operate NATO 155mm artillery shells and 105mm tank shells. Most of the Taiwanese army equipment is quite old. It is a mixture of western and domestic supplies. Officers reported having to buy spare parts themself from suppliers and tools from Amazon even. All from their own money. Their own money which is not even much to start with. This is absolutely ridiculous. It must stop. Taiwan is buying more equipment from America. It may become a point that the whole system just collapses. Ukraine does not have time so they are given an insane number of equipment models and variants to defend themselves. They do their best to make do and adapt. Taiwan has some time so use this wisely to organise logistics.

A contributing factor is too many combat vehicle models. This needs to be restructured. Cull number of CM-11 being upgraded. Money saved should be spent on buying more M1A2T Abrams & hard kill APS. Retire M41D, V-150, CM-12, LVTP-5A1, LVTH-6, M1 240mm, M1 Long Tom 155mm. These are either stored, severely antiquated vehicles or equipment which serve no purpose. This will cut down on 1 ammunition type (240mm), simplify logistics and reduce the workload on maintenance depot troops.

Artillery is one key area where there are too many models. There are two types of 105mm, 5 types of 155mm, 2 types of 203mm. A new generation of 155mm is being procured to replace the M109A2/A5. Initially it was going to be M109A6 Paladin but due production backlogs it is looking like Czech artillery from Excalibur Army. This should replace all types of 155mm. Towed and self-propelled. Taiwan is an island nation. Ammunition resupply will not be possible unless there is full western intervention. There are only so many finite shells. So having 5 types of 155mm with 650+ pieces is pointless. You rather have 200-250 Czech self-propelled guns. Which are more accurate (so less shells will be fired), more survivable and faster firing rate. Totally streamlines logistical and training. If you have 650+ pieces you’ll have 400+ just laying around. There are just not enough ammo, spare parts and trained crews to go around. Moreover, 1 Czech 155mm will fulfil the role of multiple old M109s. Keep some M109s in reserve however due to attrition rates. The remaining guns can be sold around. Western allies will be more than happy to buy them for Ukraine. Spare guns must be kept in good quality storage. 5-10 man hours of maintenance per month per gun. The oldest guns (Ukraine even refused M1114 from Portugal stating they are too old & inaccurate) can be stripped down and used as decoys. Due to the photo report nature of the PLA. Even if a drone pilot detects a decoy and knows it is a decoy it will still be targeted to appease command. Always reduce, recycle, reuse. Again remove the towed 203mm M115 and only keep the M110A2. There is still a place for towed guns. They do not have to rely on their own engines as they are pulled by an external vehicle. So if one breaks, another can tow. The L118 can be towed by a Range Rover even. If the engine of the SPG breaks then the gun is immobile until a repair crew arrives. They are however slower to set up and relocate. Moreover, with a towed vehicle the gun and the ammo is separate so the risk of a catastrophic loss is less. When a SPG is hit the ammo can cook off. But, Taiwanese towed 155mm the M1114 & Long Tom are simply too old. You can get modern towed guns such as the M777. The M777 is currently out of production but BAE is looking into reopening it.

Keeping the two models of towed 105mm is fine as the T-64 is just a domestic made M101. 105mm is portable and light. The main mission for 105mm is infantry fire support whilst 155mm is destruction of targets. Mountings 105mm on a HUMVEE chassis was tested by the US under the Hawkeye program name. It is shown at a number of expos. Taiwan has 1,000s of HUMVEEs.

The British Army by comparison has 1 type of 105mm (L118) and 2 types of 155mm (AS-90, Archer). AS-90 will be replaced in the future by a to be decided system. All 203mm was retired from service after the Cold War ended. The Abbot self-propelled 105mm was retired in 1995 likely due to the end of the Cold War and budget cuts. Lion Research Co deems this a mistake due to the high mobility and lethality of the Abbot.

Domestic equipment is not any better regarding spare parts. Parts are sourced from numerous foreign countries, there are too many contractors and it is not centralised. As many parts should be domestic as possible. The US demands that all military equipment is at least 50% American. 3D printing is a growing area for spare parts. Taiwan, which is highly innovative, should explore. The British Army is already developing this tactic. 3D printing is possible in field conditions.

Solar & portable generators are a must, again Taiwan & the PLA lacks them. Ukrainian troops buy them on the civilian market. The most company brand being Jackery. These are used for many purposes such as charging combat tablets and thermal scopes.

Ukraine operates specialist field repair teams which can do engine changes, track repairs and other maintenance in the field without needing to go to a depot. You want vehicles out of action for as little time as possible. The location of field repair depots will need to be kept as secret as ammo depots. If Taiwan is struggling during peace it will only be worse during war. Mobile mechanics are key. Standard logistical trucks can be outfitted with a workshop container. Using civilian contractors can help a lot as well. The US Armed Forces use more civilian contractors than any other. Specialist civilian contractors can be used in equipment repairs and maintenance. However, Taiwan in comparison has very few. Conscript mechanics should also be trained. A program should be done where conscript mechanics can then become civilian mechanics on release to incentivise the role.

Taiwanese logistical troops also need to be prepared for a mammoth amount of tyre changes. Due to shrapnel, heavy payloads, debris, & scatter mines tyres are routinely damaged in Ukraine. The PLA will not be able to emplace traditional mines but they may mount remote mine systems on vessels then fire at key Taiwanese logistical routes Taiwan successfully uses the 155mm RAAMS & M270 AT2 mine for this purpose. The Russian ISDM Zemledeliye is one of the prime targets for ZSU. Russia also mounts universal mine launchers on BTR APCs. Once damaged, speed and manoeuvrability is severely degraded. They must be changed and in a prompt manner.

In arduis fidelis:

Medical training for all is vital. Taiwan again is deficient in this field. All troops regardless of role must know the basics of emergency combat aid. When it comes to conscript refresher courses this is essential. Conscripts will also benefit from this in civilian life. Being able to immediately apply a tourniquet and an Israeli bandage is the matter of life or death. When on exercises you do not see Taiwanese troops with IFAKs (infantry first aid kits) or tourniquets. PLA troops do not either. However, PLA medical training and organisation is of a better quality. The PLA routinely trains other countries, performs UN medical operations and trained with even Germany. Troops should also have at least one, ideally two tourniquets on them at all time in a standard location (US Army regulations). Standard location is vital so troops know where to look quickly. Ukrainian troops generally keep them near their shoulders. Always use the wounded patients tourniquets not yours as you may need them laters. Training on said equipment is vital as poorly using it negates its effectiveness. Moreover, high quality tourniquets must be procured. In Ukraine there is an issue with poor quality made models being sent to troops. These mainly stem from Chinese suppliers. This throws into quality the PLA’s medical equipment. The majority of Ukrainians tourniquets however are CAT (American, best quality) or Dnipro (domestic, still good). Strict testing is required.The logo, stitching and packaging are ways you can tell a real from a fake. Russian troops, unless you buy it yourself, are given dreadful quality IFAKs, some from the 1960s. This is one reason for high Russian casualty figures. In Afghanistan due to prompt medical assistance and rapid CASEVAC by helicopter, there was a death to survival ratio of 1:10. For Ukraine it is around 3.5:1 but for Russia it is worse. Taiwan will not be able to perform helicopter evacuation. They must maintain many fully stocked casualty evacuation vehicle. Not all Ukrainian medevac vehicles have an AED which has cost lives. Ukraine operates ‘stabilisation points’ between the front lines and the field hospitals. Effectively large battalion aid stations. These are vital in keeping troops alive. It can take up to 90 mins to reach a field hospital. Truly heroic actions are performed here by medics daily. Many Ukrainian medics are women. Taiwan needs to be able to quickly mobilise field hospitals. Classroom instructions and combat simulators are vital in medical exercises. Russia had a problem, before the full scale war, of fake medical exercises being done to appease command. Ukraine operates numerous mobile training centres which travel around different units providing crucial learning.

Always remember fire safety:

Fire extinguishers can be the difference between a destruction and just light damage. All vehicles must have them and all troops must be trained on them. A Ukrainian AHS Krab SPG was destroyed when a fire started and no fire suppression was on hand to deal with it. A simple extinguisher is critical. When on parade and expo Taiwanese vehicles are equipped with extinguishers. However, this may not be standard practice but it must be. Moreover, the dates on them need to be checked often. Due to the dreadful state of logistics it will not be surprising if they are broken/expired. Usually they are stored on the inside however some vehicles do not. Uniquely the British Fv103 stores it on the exterior right side of the hull.

Training grounds:

PLA training grounds and command centres are generally more modern and more advanced. Modern training grounds allow for troops to train more effectively and reduce the time & rounds needed. Most of Taiwan’s security infrastructure is old and is in need of replacement/upgrade. Due to China’s much larger geographical size the PLA can train with more freedom and in larger sizes.

Rations:

When in combat, normally it is not possible to access a field kitchen therefore rations are needed. Around the world all armies use a similar MRE style packaging and heating elements. However, the PLA has an issue with their rations. There are quality and taste issues. The packaging is also heavier and not as logistically friendly as other countries. PLA logistics will be across an ocean you want as little weight and room used up as possible so more can be transported. Taiwan does not have to worry as much about weight or size. Taiwanese rations also generally taste better. Having a warm tasty meal as a soldier is massive. It improves morale and combat ability. Sleep will be minimum for both sides during the initial phrases.

NCOs:

Non-commissioned officers are vital to maintain organisation, morale, cohesion and fighting ability. The activities of a unit on the tactical scale are executed by NCOs. They are senior experienced enlists of sergeant and warrant officer rank. If a junior officer is killed or wounded they take over. Russia lacks a sizable NCO corp and this is one of the reasons for their failure. The PLA recognises this and is trying to expand it. However, there are problems. There is a lack of education amongst some enlist and even soldiers. The army is seen as a place to go for a job. PLA pay is not good. The National Interest states a colonel only gets 37,260 USD per year. This will not attract the brightest and most educated soldiers. Pay as mentioned earlier impacts Taiwan. For the PLA there are different pathways to become an NCO. Most NCOs are soldiers that volunteer after their 2 years of service. They undergo extra training. This is very quick compared to NATO armies where it normally takes at least minimum 4-5 years to become a junior NCO. Other plans are to pipeline NCO roles for achieving highschool students and recruit technical NCOs from those with experience in the field. Becoming an NCO without being a soldier means you will lack core knowledge and experience you get on the job. This can also cause morale issues. Since one should become an NCO from service and hard work. You cannot just skip ranks. There is low retention in the PLA which is not helping maintain skill. Emigration continues to increase from China which will not help. As China ages and there is less demand for higher paying jobs the idea of joining the army will be less appealing. Without NCOs PLA landing forces will be confused and not be able to make the most out of their equipment. Xi is committed to a ‘world class army’ by 2049. Being numerically big is not everything. Due to the Taiwanese strait China cannot bring troops.

PLA fixations:

The PLA has many fixations. Above all, they want to be seen as strong and cohesive. There are many parades showcasing their numbers and equipment. Russia would always do this as well and look how that turned out. Many analysts believed the strongman image of the RuAF. Xi knows if people fall for a PLA unstoppable idea then aid to Taipei will be less. The PLA recently released a propaganda documentary about invading Taiwan. Of how soldiers would happily die for such a war. Other fixations include goose-steps, and social media videos. There are many PLA videos on the internet of flamethrowers, hand to hand combat and troops in general performing not tactically. Such as 20 vehicles lined up in a row with troops mounting. To the average viewer they cannot see this.

Combat experience:

Combat is always the greatest test of an army. Having experience will build combat effectiveness and troops will be less shocked. For both sides any full scale war will be nothing like they have experienced. Neither side has fought a conventional war in a long time. The PLA is however vastly more experienced in combat and regularly attends international army games & competitions. The PLA performs many UN peacekeeping missions whilst Taiwan does not. We must recall the ROC is not an UN member only the PRC.

Hidden Enemy:

The enemies you cannot see are the worst. This enemy has wrecked the Russian Armed Forces and defence industry in so many ways. Corruption. It can occur at any level. Russia is a prime case study of corruption. It results in overpriced equipment procurement due to kickbacks and companies linked to political elites getting contracts. Equipment of poorer standard and a much weaker armed forces. Examples include troops having to pay officers if they want to rest from combat, conscripts can pay a doctor 10k dollars to be declared medically unfit, troops are equipped with 1960s medical kits which do not work, military spec components in radios are switched with cheap foreign counterparts. During the Russian biannual conscription drives (spring and autumn) the rich and powerful do not take part. This leaves a pool of recruits who are poorer and physically weaker (cannot afford a good diet). The list is totally endless. Most well known is the utterly horrendous state of Russian stored vehicles. You will hear newspapers saying ‘Russia has 12k tanks’. Totally untrue unless you count T-72 Urals with stolen engines, broken radiators and all the copper wires sold on the market. The Russian logistical corp is by far the most corrupt and unprofessional branch. Front lines combat units have prestige so the bad officers and those who are especially corrupt get sent to the logistical corp. Corruption totally ruins an army.

However, corruption is what keeps the Russian power structure in order. You buy loyalty by turning a blind eye. Meaning those in power keep their positions and opposition is minimal. As you become more senior you can become more corrupt. It is why being an officer is a solid option especially to generally poorer ethnic minorities. Corruption is so massive it would be possible to make an entire report on it. There have been drives to remove this issue but they have been weak and the magnitude has not changed. Simply put, it massively impacts fighting capability morale is less with rank and file being angry. Troops are more vulnerable due to being less equipped and you have a poorer army. The most embarrassing example of corruption impacting military operations for Russia was troops running out of fuel on the invasion route to Kyiv. Since they sold it to Belarussian civilians.

Corruption in Taiwan is less but is still present. Taipei has the Agency Against Corruption (part of the ministry of Justice) and is going through reforms. There are anti-corruption laws with protected whistle blowing. Taiwan has ratified the UN Convention Against Corruption and the Asia/Pacific Group on money laundering. Transparency International ranks Taiwan 25 out of 180 countries and with a score of 68 (out of 100) this is relatively good especially for Asia. There has been score progression in recent years but more action is needed. 90% of the Taiwanese public think government corruption is a big problem and 17% of public service users have paid a bribe. Small scale corruption is a problem. Senior officers use state budgets to buy meals and other gifts. It may be minor in comparison but it undermines military integrity. Without cohesion you have no military. More corruption will again put off people from joining.

On a political note. Voter buying still exists. It is known as ’heijin’ or black gold. China was reportedly buying a number of votes in the latest elections. For quite obvious reasons. If you have local politicians that are willing to offer support and information an invasion is easier. The issue is more prevalent in rural areas. A small minority of Ukrainian local officials upon being invaded did hand over information which harmed defence. There have been raids to deal with this but a number of raids will not totally get rid of the problem. Organised crime is linked to some of these buys. It is unlikely organised crime will plot against Taiwan in case of an invasion but it is plausible. Ukrainian organised crime refused to help Russia saying they may be criminals but are not traitors. Illegal lobbying is common due to weakly enforced laws. Even though by law it is mandatory many people do just not register. However, on the whole the elections are free and fair.

One of the most well known cases of Taiwanese military corruption was the Lafayette Scandal. In 1998 the former foreign of France Ronald Dumas alleges that 500 million euros were paid in kickbacks to push through the sale of 8 Lafayette class frigates. These are known in Taiwan as the Kang Ding class. The arms dealer, Andrew Wang, in charge had his Swiss accounts frozen and he fled to the UK. As discussed earlier, this purchase was unwise. This highlights the necessity for transparency and honesty in government procurements especially with the main defence company National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology.

It also came to light in early August that an investigation was launched into the leaking of military secrets. Several officers, including a Lt Col, are suspected of giving out state secrets to the CCP. It is unknown if this was done for money or out of political beliefs. The Ministry of Defence pledged strict actions for this ‘shameful’ event. The US government is concerned and this is likely a reason why requests for certain weapons such as the F-35 were refused. With better pay, morale and clear aims & objectives the number of espionage cases should decrease. It is unknown as of now what the nature of the secrets leaked were.

What is needed to deal with Taiwanese corruption? Stronger civil groups, laws which are enforced, honesty and respect of the rule of law. No one is above the law. The head of the Ukrainian Supreme Court was arrested on charges of bribery. Yes, this is not a great look but it indicates the law is working and no one, even the supreme court is above the law. To win back public support and trust there will be harsh truths told.

Zelensky recently announced plans to elevate the status of corruption to treason under martial law. Corruption is effectively treason and a betrayal of your country and its people.

Exercises:

Every year there is the annual full scale Han Kuang Exercise alongside a number of other smaller ones. Upon viewing the footage of the exercises they seem to be heavily scripted. Senior officers likely enjoy writing reports to command saying how they won by such a margin. The deployment of troops is unnatural and shows a lack of intuition. Especially amongst the infantry you could tell the manoeuvres were just for show. Moreover, Taiwanese defenders seem to always win. OPFOR (opposing force) exercises are a great tool to train troops. What is needed is realistic red versus blue exercises. Remove the overt China vs Taiwan element so eliminate any favouritism. If you always win in training or exercises then there is a problem. The lack of quality training exercises was a reason for why Russian troops performed badly in Ukraine. These tick box exercises need to stop. The tanks and artillery live fire training are bare bones basic. Vehicles line up on the shore in a straight line, like its Redcoats reenactment, then fire into the ocean. This does not train troops for anything. Tankers need to be trained on communication, formation, tactical movements, obstacle clearance, field repairs. Artillery on emplacement, rapid relocation, communication with other nearby units, damage control.

Foreign advisors can help change these exercises. US Marines regularly train in Taiwan and Taiwanese marines do the same in Hawaii. This should be expanded. NATO’s presence regarding Taiwan is expanding. There was an academic exchange at the NATO Defence College in Italy. However, there is no official NATO-Taiwan relation. Unless Taiwan is invited to NATO’s partnership for peace program it is unlikely the ROC will be a part of official NATO exercises such as Cold Response in Norway. For political reasons this will likely not happen. Certain NATO members will want to maintain very cordial relations with Beijing.

Safety:

On a final note it may be deemed as not vital but safety is critical to combat effectiveness . Taiwan has an above average number of safety violations amongst all branches. They may be just ‘incidents’ but there is always a chain of events that lead to them. On the 24th of July, of this year, 9 troops were injured in a mortar explosion. In July 2022 a soldier was unfortunately killed during tank maintenance. Also in 2022 3 aircrafts, of varying types, crashed. It is impossible to remove all incidents but Taiwan suffers an abnormal number of them. The most infamous crash was the 2020 UH-60 crash that killed the chief of staff and other senior officers.The military and government are starting to take responsibility and pledge for more safety. There is a need for more than just pledges. Firm action. This will be a part of the overarching military reforms. With a poor safety record it will be harder to attract the best recruits amongst the dwindling numbers. Action will save future lives. All investigations need to be independent and criticism of the Taiwanese government be allowed. The poor training and lack of NCOs & officers are highly likely a key factor in the safety track record. Hazing rituals must stop.

Military and civil law must be followed at all times. Any breach regardless of rank needs to be dealt with.

We hope that the Taiwanese Armed Forces never have to be fully tested and there is no war.

Strength via deterrence